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It is the common wonder of all men, how among so many million faces, there 
should be none alike. – Sir Thomas Browne, author and physician, born 1605, died 
1682 
The world has changed greatly since Sir Thomas Browne’s day, not least of all in 
terms of population. While Sir Thomas marveled at the diversity posed by millions 
of faces, he likely never conceived of a day when the world would house more 
than seven billion people. Yet this is reality in the 21st century. 
While the average person will encounter a scant fraction of the entire population, 
the number of individuals we will interact and cross paths with throughout our 
lifetime is staggering. Nevertheless, every day we rapidly identify the myriad 
people we see as friends, colleagues, and even strangers. Of course, merely being 
able to lump people into these crude categories is not enough; we also need to be 
able to recognize unique individuals. Remarkably, despite the visual complexity of 
faces, we are able to quickly and effortlessly do just this: in the case of familiar 
individuals, as soon as we know that we are looking at a face, we can also provide 
the specific identity of that face (Tanaka, 2001). Although this may not seem 
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impressive at first glance, the fact that we can identify faces at the individual level 
(also known as the subordinate level) so quickly is actually somewhat unusual.  In 
general, objects are most quickly and easily identified at the basic level of 
categorization (e.g., Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976), which is 
known as the basic-level advantage. For example, most people will be faster to 
identify something as a “dog” (basic level) than to say it is an “animal” 
(superordinate level) or an “English Bull Terrier” (subordinate level).  
This is not the only way in which faces appear to be processed in a special way: 
while most objects are processed in a parts-based fashion where the individual 
features drive recognition, faces are processed holistically. A variety of tasks have 
consistently revealed that we perceive faces as unified wholes; it is extremely 
difficult for us to selectively attend to discrete facial features without also 
processing the rest of the face (Hayward, Rhodes, & Schwaninger, 2008; Hole, 
1994; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Young, Hellawell, & Hay, 1987).  Holistic effects 
may occur because faces are encoded in terms of a template in which the parts are 
not independently represented (e.g., Farah, Wilson, Drain, & Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka 
& Farah, 1993; Tsao & Livingstone, 2008), or they may occur at the level of 
perceptual decisions, such that it is not possible to make independent judgments 
about the individual features within the face (Richler, Gauthier, Wenger, & Palmeri, 




It has been argued that holistic processing is unique to faces (e.g., McKone & 
Kanwisher, 2005; McKone, Kanwisher, & Duchaine, 2007; Robbins & McKone, 
2007). The inversion effect (Yin, 1969)—in which recognition of faces is 
disproportionately disrupted compared to other objects when rotated 180º in the 
picture plane—is commonly taken as evidence of this. An alternative, known as the 
expertise hypothesis, posits that holistic processing results from the specific type of 
experience we gain with faces, individuating and identifying them at the 
subordinate level. In accordance with this hypothesis, inversion effects have also 
been observed for objects of expertise, where individuation is also required (Curby, 
Glazek, & Gauthier, 2009; Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rossion & Curran, 2010). 
Interestingly, individuation expertise with a specific domain can also reduce the 
basic-level advantage for objects in much the same way as is seen for faces 
(Bukach, Vickery, Kinka, & Gauthier, 2011; Tanaka & Taylor, 1991; Wong, Palmeri, 
& Gauthier, 2009). Thus, it appears that experience individuating an object set has 
the potential to fundamentally change the way those objects are perceived and 
processed, ultimately shifting from a parts-based to a holistic strategy.  
Despite its popularity, the inversion effect may not be ideal for assessing holistic 
processing. Instead, it may more effectively tap into configural processing, which 
codes the arrangement and spatial relations of features relative to one another 
(Rhodes, Brake, Taylor, & Tan, 1989). Although inversion appears to disrupt 
configural processing (Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes et al., 1989; Rossion & 
Gauthier, 2002), it is less clear what effect this has on holistic processing (Murray, 
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2004; Richler, Mack, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2011). As will be discussed in greater 
detail in the following section, the composite task currently offers the best measure 
of holistic processing. Using this method, holistic processing has been observed for 
faces (e.g., Hole, 1994) as well as a variety of visually homogenous non-face 
stimuli with which participants have considerable visual expertise such as cars 
(Bukach, Phillips, & Gauthier, 2010), musical notation (Wong & Gauthier, 2010), 
and novel stimuli following training in the laboratory (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; 
Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009).  
 
Investigating Holistic Processing with the Composite Task 
The role of holistic processing in face perception has been explored using a wide 
variety of tasks. One method is the parts-whole paradigm, which finds that 
individual features are better recognized within the context of the entire face as 
compared to on their own (Tanaka & Farah, 1993). More recently, the blurred-
scrambled paradigm has been used, which compares face recognition for faces 
where the featural information is obscured but the configuration of parts is 
preserved (blurred condition) with faces in which configuration is disrupted but 
individual components are preserved (scrambled condition) (Hayward et al., 2008). 
Because face recognition is more heavily dependent on configural information, 
performance is better for blurred faces, where this information is preserved. In 
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addition to these methods, the composite task has gained a good deal of popularity 
and is viewed as a more direct measure of holistic processing. 
The composite task is based on an effect first demonstrated by Young and 
colleagues in 1987, in which they found that it was more difficult to identify the 
top half of a famous person’s face when it was aligned with the bottom half of 
another celebrity’s face. For example, it is more difficult to identify the top half of a 
face as belonging to Bill Clinton if it is aligned with the bottom half of George W. 
Bush’s face. These faces, in which the top and bottom halves of different faces are 
recombined to form a new face, are known as composite faces. More recent 
implementations of this task have used matching of parts of composites of 
unfamiliar faces (e.g., Hole, 1994). In this version of the task, participants judge 
whether the top halves of two sequentially presented faces are the same or different. 
Young et al. (1987) proposed that participants’ difficulty with composite faces 
stems from the fact that when two face halves are aligned with each other, the 
configuration of the parts causes a powerful illusion of an entirely new face, and 
this face elicits holistic processing where each part of the face interferes with the 
independent identification of the other.  In the composite task, the goal of 
participants is to limit their attention to just one half of the face, so processing parts 
of the face that they are meant to ignore could hurt performance. In essence, within 
the context of the composite task, holistic processing can be thought of as a failure 
of selective attention. Additionally, because processing stimuli holistically is 
actually counterproductive in this paradigm, the composite task also allows us to 
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investigate how automatic or dominant a holistic processing strategy is for a 
particular object set. Consequently, the composite task has been used to investigate 
a wide variety of face-related phenomena in which holistic processing is thought to 
play a role such as: the development of face perception (De Heering, Houthuys, & 
Rossion, 2007; Mondloch, Pathman, Maurer, Grand, & De Schonen, 2007; Turati, 
Di Giorgio, Bardi, & Simion, 2010), cognitive impairments in face recognition as 
seen in autism, schizophrenia and prosopagnosia (Gauthier, Klaiman, & Schultz, 
2009; Le Grand et al., 2003, 2006; Schwartz, Marvel, Drapalski, Rosse, & Deutsch, 
2002; Teunisse & De Gelder, 2003) , evaluating computer models of vision (Dailey 
& Cottrell, 1999), the inversion effect (Mondloch & Maurer, 2008; Richler, Mack, 
et al., 2011), and the other-race effect (Michel, Corneille, & Rossion, 2007; Michel, 
Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, 2006; Mondloch et al., 2010). 
With tasks that manipulate the orientation of the face or the position of features 
within the face relative to one another, holistic and configural processing are 
difficult to tease apart and may be erroneously conflated (see Murray, 2004 for an 
example). The composite task, however, allows for holistic processing to be more 
directly assessed, thus it is not surprising to find it has been so widely adopted and 
embraced. According to a review by Richler & Gauthier (submitted), more than 70 
papers using this task have been published. However, there are currently two 
versions of the composite task in use, and they often produce incompatible results, 
including—most critically—whether holistic processing does (Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier, 2011a; McGugin, Richler, Herzmann, Speegle & Gauthier, submitted) or 
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does not (Konar, Bennett, & Sekuler, 2010; Wang, Li, Fang, Tian, & Liu, 2012) 
contribute to face recognition. Clearly the relationship between holistic processing 
and face recognition ability has important theoretical ramifications: the expertise 
hypothesis suggests that holistic processing arises due to our ample experience 
individuating and recognizing faces. If this is true, then it logically follows that 
recognition performance should be correlated with the amount of holistic 
processing that is elicited for faces. Unfortunately, the two versions of the 
composite task currently in use are not equivalent because they do not measure the 
same thing, and the version used can dramatically affect one’s conclusions. 
Although this dissertation is not the place to discuss all the reasons why one of the 
designs is fundamentally flawed (for an extensive review of this issue, see Richler & 
Gauthier, submitted), the issue is important and serves as partial motivation for the 
subsequent studies outlined and conducted. As such, I will provide a brief 
overview of the two forms of the composite task that are currently in use, as well as 
why one version lacks validity and how this results in the need to revisit several of 
the questions about holistic processing that have been addressed in the literature. 
 
The Partial Design versus the Complete Design 
The two versions of the composite task are known as the partial design and the 
complete design (Gauthier & Bukach, 2007). Both involve same/different judgments 
on the top or bottom halves of sequentially presented composite faces made up of 
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unfamiliar faces. In the partial design, the target half of the face can be either the 
same or different across the two composite faces, but the unattended portion of the 
face always changes across the two presentations. The critical manipulation in this 
design is whether the top and bottom halves of the composite faces are aligned or 
misaligned with one another. Within this framework, predictions about holistic 
processing can only be made for “same” trials (Robbins & McKone, 2007); 
specifically, holistic processing is thought to be reflected in an alignment effect, 
where accuracy on “same” trials is better when the faces are misaligned than when 
they are aligned. This is because if an item is processed holistically, the irrelevant 
part—which is always different—cannot be ignored and will therefore interfere 
with correctly identifying the target part as “same”.  
In the complete design, the complementary portion of the condition matrix is also 
utilized, such that same/different trials where the irrelevant half does not change 
across presentations are also included (as opposed to always being different, as in 
the partial design). Consequently, trials can be “congruent” (where the correct 
response to the target half of the face is consistent with the response one would 
make to the irrelevant half of the face) or “incongruent” (where the correct 
response to the target half of the face conflicts with the response one would make 
to the irrelevant part of the face). This notion of congruency is integral to the 
complete design, and unlike the partial design, predictions can be made for both 
same and different trials. Here, congruency is what matters: if an item is processed 
holistically (i.e., one cannot selectively attend to one half of the object), then 
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performance (as measured in terms of sensitivity: d’) should be better on congruent 
versus incongruent trials. This is known as the congruency effect. As in the partial 
design, alignment is often manipulated in the complete design, though this is not 
strictly necessary. When alignment of the composites is included as a factor, then 
holistic processing is identified through a congruency x alignment interaction. 
Specifically, the congruency effect (i.e., better performance on congruent than 
incongruent trials) should be present when the composite stimuli are aligned, but 
should be reduced or abolished when the parts are misaligned, as this disrupts 
holistic processing. 
To understand why the partial design is fundamentally flawed, it is important to 
recall that according to signal detection theory, deciding whether the target half of 
a face is the same or different requires evaluating both perceptual information and 
an internal response bias. When one simply compares accuracy across two 
conditions, it is impossible to know whether these differences should be attributed 
to changes in perception or changes in one’s criterion; separating these two 
components requires looking at both hits (i.e., correctly responding “same” on 
“same” trials) and false alarms (i.e., incorrectly responding “same” on “different” 
trials). However, as discussed above, only accuracy on “same” trials is analyzed in 
the partial design, meaning that it is impossible to know whether changes in 
perception or bias are driving the difference between aligned and misaligned trials. 
This is not an issue with the complete design as both “same” and “different” trials 
are used, so d’ can be calculated, which provides a measure of perceptual 
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sensitivity that is independent of response bias. Additionally, in the complete 
design, decisional criterion (c) can also be calculated, so that the effect of a 
manipulation on bias can be directly assessed.  
Some researchers have attempted to address the issue of bias in the partial design 
by using the “different” trials in their analyses to calculate d’ (e.g., Konar et al., 
2010). While this controls for criterion shifts associated with alignment, there is 
another form of bias in the partial design that cannot be overcome in this way: 
changes in bias related to congruency. This critical problem is inherent to the 
partial design, because there is no way to estimate this bias with only the partial 
design trials. Congruency is confounded with correct response: “same” trials are 
always incongruent and “different” trials are always congruent. Using the complete 
design, it has been shown that congruency does affect bias, with participants more 
likely to respond “different” on incongruent trials (Farah et al., 1998; Richler, Mack, 
Gauthier, & Palmeri, 2009). To make matters worse, congruency and other factors 
such as alignment can interact to influence bias (Cheung, Richler, Palmeri, & 
Gauthier, 2008; Richler, Gauthier, et al., 2008; Richler, Tanaka, et al., 2008), 
which makes partial design results even more difficult to interpret. 
The problem of bias contamination in the partial design cannot be overstated 
because it ultimately means that it is impossible to know what the alignment effect 
is actually measuring. There may be instances when the alignment effect accurately 
reflects holistic processing, but what about instances when the partial design and 
complete design result in discrepant conclusions about holistic processing? In 
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many cases, the alignment effect, as measured in the partial design, can be 
accounted for in terms of changes in response bias resulting from the interaction 
between congruency and alignment (Cheung et al., 2008; Richler, Mack, et al., 
2011). Additionally, holistic processing, when measured through the partial design, 
can be manipulated through explicit instructions (Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 
2011b). By altering participants’ beliefs regarding the proportion of “same” or 
“different” trials they would see (when in reality, the proportion was held constant), 
it was possible to change whether holistic processing, as inferred through the 
alignment effect of the partial design, was present or not. This finding stands in 
stark opposition to all theoretical accounts of holistic processing, which is 
considered automatic and relatively resistant to top-down control (Richler, Bukach, 
& Gauthier, 2009; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011b; Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 
2011). In contrast, when using the complete design, holistic processing—as 
indexed by the congruency by alignment interaction in d’—was unaffected by 
instructional manipulations, with response bias changing instead. Thus, in the 
complete design, changes in strategy are reflected in shifts in criterion, but not in d’, 
which only reflects changes in perceptual processing. In the partial design, changes 
in both perception and bias will be reflected in the alignment effect. 
The partial design of the composite task not only results in counterintuitive 
judgments about the factors that can influence holistic processing, but also the role 
holistic processing plays in face recognition. According to the expertise hypothesis, 
holistic processing is believed to arise due to our extensive experience 
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individuating faces (e.g., Diamond & Carey, 1986; Rhodes et al., 1989). Thus, one 
would logically expect that the extent to which faces are processed holistically 
should predict face recognition performance. Critically, this relationship is only 
confirmed when holistic processing is measured using the complete design 
(McGugin et al., submitted; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011a), but not when the 
partial design is used (Konar et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2012). 
Together, these pieces of evidence form a convincing argument against using the 
partial design, demonstrating it to be unreliable and invalid. Unfortunately, many 
aspects of face perception have been investigated almost exclusively using this 
flawed design. Thus, many of the conclusions that have been drawn regarding 
holistic processing based on partial design studies alone are potentially incorrect 
and misleading and must be re-evaluated using a valid design, such as the 
complete design composite task. One important area of face recognition literature 
that falls into this category is the role holistic processing plays in the perception of 
other-race faces. 
 
The Other-Race Effect (ORE) and the Role of Holistic Processing 
The Other-Race Effect (ORE; also known as the Cross-Race Effect and the Own-
Race Bias) has fascinated researchers for nearly a century. First reported by 
Feingold in 1914, the ORE refers to the difficulty individuals of one race have in 
recognizing and remembering the faces of individuals from another race (Brigham 
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& Barkowitz, 1978; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
Although countless studies have been conducted examining the nuances of the 
ORE in the past hundred years (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for a review), 
investigations into its underlying causes have been less extensive.  
One theory as to why the ORE is observed is based on the expertise hypothesis, 
which suggests that our difficulty discriminating between other-race faces lies in 
our relative lack of experience individuating them (Lebrecht, Pierce, Tarr, & Tanaka, 
2009; McGugin, Tanaka, Lebrecht, Tarr, & Gauthier, 2011; Rhodes et al., 1989; 
Tanaka & Pierce, 2009). As a result, we may process and encode the information 
that is important for identity less efficiently than we do same-race faces with which 
we have extensive individuation experience. Many studies examining the ORE 
have found that the size of the ORE is inversely related to one’s experience with 
another race: the more one is exposed to other-race faces, the smaller the 
recognition deficit when dealing with them (Gajewski, Schlegel, & Stoerig, 2008; 
Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Rossion, et al., 2006; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, 
2004). 
One possible explanation for why a lack of experience with other-race faces may 
make them harder to recognize and remember is that the features that are the most 
diagnostic for discriminating between faces may vary based on race. 
Anthropometric studies indicate that the size and relative distance of facial features, 
as well as the extent to which they vary, differs across race (Farkas, 1994). 
Moreover, principle component analyses (PCA) have revealed that the components 
  
   14 
that largely account for the variability across faces of a particular race are not the 
same as the principle components that are identified for faces of other races 
(O’Toole, Deffenbacher, Valentin, & Abdi, 1994), suggesting that the diagnostic 
qualities of a feature are race-specific. This may be why Caucasian and African 
individuals focus on different facial features when verbally describing same-race 
faces (Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975; Shepherd & Deregowski, 1981). 
Inherent to this notion that different features may play a larger role in identity for 
different races is the importance of experience. A lifetime of experience 
individuating faces of a particular race has taught us that certain features are more 
important than others for individuation. If the usefulness of these features does not 
carry over to other-race faces, however, then it is no surprise that recognition 
suffers. Hills & Lewis (2007) found that training participants to attend to the lower 
half of Caucasian faces on a discrimination task significantly reduced the ORE for 
African American faces, where the lower half of the face has been identified as 
being of considerable importance (Ellis et al., 1975; Shepherd & Deregowski, 1981). 
This improvement did not occur for participants who performed the discrimination 
training with Caucasian faces where the critical features were located in the top 
half of the face. 
It would be shortsighted, however, to suggest that the only effect of experience 
individuating faces of a particular race is increased sensitivity to diagnostic features. 
Even when identical manipulations are made to the exact same features of same-
race and other-race faces, the ORE is still observed (Rhodes et al., 2006). For 
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example, when the eyes are altered in the exact same way on Caucasian and Asian 
faces, Caucasians were more sensitive to changes made to the Caucasian faces, 
whereas Asian participants were more sensitive to the changes made to Asian faces. 
If the ORE occurred solely because we are differentially sensitive to certain featural 
cues that vary based on race, then no difference between same-race and other-race 
faces should result when the exact same manipulations are performed on the two 
sets of faces. Differences in feature diagnosticity does not account for why 
Caucasians would be sensitive to changes in the eye region of Caucasian faces but 
not the same region of Asian faces. While it is certainly possible that extensive 
experience with a particular race makes us more sensitive to the diagnostic 
dimensions of same-race faces, the very nature of how the face as a whole is 
processed may be affected as well. It has been suggested that our lack of 
experience individuating other-race faces may result in them being processed in a 
qualitatively different fashion than same-race faces (Michel et al., 2006; Murray, 
Rhodes, Schuchinsky, 2003; Rhodes et al., 1989; Tanaka et al., 2004, but see 
Mondloch et al., 2010). Given the known link between perceptual expertise and 
holistic processing (Bukach et al., 2010; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Richler, Mack, et 
al., 2011; Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009; Wong & Gauthier, 2010), it may be 
that while same-race faces are processed holistically, other-race face recognition 
may instead rely more exclusively upon more feature-based recognition 
mechanisms. Of course the difference between the two could also be quantitative 
in nature, that is, other-race faces are still processed holistically, but perhaps less 
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holistic processing is elicited or is carried out less efficiently than for same-race 
faces. The possibility that experience could ultimately change the underlying 
mechanisms that carry out other-race and same-race face recognition (or at least 
change the efficiency with which they operate) may explain why the processing 
goals one has when acquiring experience with other-race faces appears to be 
important. Specifically, individuating other-race faces seems to be the key for 
improving performance on subsequent perceptual discrimination tasks with other-
race faces (McGugin, Tanaka, et al., 2011) or on recognition memory tasks (Tanaka 
& Pierce, 2009). In comparison, training participants on an attentionally 
demanding perceptual discrimination task or merely having participants observe 
faces and identify their race does not appear sufficient to improve performance. 
An alternative to the expertise hypothesis is that the ORE instead stems largely from 
top-down sociocognitive factors. Racial categorization can occur within 120 ms 
(Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005) and when items are segregated into ingroups and 
outgroups (such as same-race and other-race), outgroup items are more often 
processed in a categorical fashion, whereas ingroup items are individuated 
(Hugenberg & Sacco, 2008; Levin, 1996, 2000).  Additionally, outgroups are often 
viewed as more homogenous than ingroups (Judd & Park, 1988), which may 
explain why the ORE is often driven by increased false alarms for other-race faces 
(Meissner & Brigham, 2001). Proponents of sociocognitive explanations argue that 
the ORE is not actually about race and perceptual learning, but instead occurs due 
to differential processing strategies that result from cognitive biases towards 
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ingroups and outgroups (Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2012). In support 
of this hypothesis, recognition deficits comparable to the ORE can be found when 
participants are encouraged to view a subset of same-race faces as belonging to a 
social outgroup, such as attending a rival university (Bernstein, Young, & 
Hugenberg, 2007; Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Shriver, Young, 
Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Lanter, 2008; Young, Bernstein, & Hugenberg, 2010). In 
these instances, stimulus race is held constant, so these finding cannot be 
explained in terms of differences in the diagnosticity of features or changes in 
processing mechanisms as a result of perceptual expertise. 
Faces have important social relevance, but we also have massive amounts of visual 
experience with them, so it seems reasonable to consider that both bottom-up 
perceptual and top-down cognitive factors contribute in some part to the ORE. One 
recent theory from this school of thought that attempts to account for findings that 
support the expertise hypothesis as well as more sociocognitive explanations is the 
Categorization-Individuation Model (Hugenberg, Young, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2010). 
This model posits that the following three processes convolve to determine whether 
the ORE is observed: 1) social categorization, which leads to perceptual 
homogenization; 2) motivation to individuate between outgroup faces; and 3) 
perceptual expertise. Although the importance of expertise is acknowledged in this 
model, proponents of the Categorization-Individuation Model believe that expertise 
is ultimately trumped by motivation to individuate because individuation requires 
more cognitive effort than simply categorizing individuals into larger groups. 
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Accordingly, they argue face recognition is malleable, as same-race recognition 
advantages can be reduced if participants are implicitly cued (e.g., assigning a 
same-race face social outgroup status) or explicitly instructed (e.g., experimental 
instructions) to attend to the category-diagnostic information of the face rather than 
those used for individuation (Young, Hugenberg, Bernstein, & Sacco, 2009). In 
much the same way, reduced perceptual expertise leading to the ORE can be 
overcome, either by emphasizing that other-race faces are important, such as by 
assigning them high-power status (Ackerman et al., 2006; Becker et al., 2010; 
Shriver & Hugenberg, 2010), or by making participants aware of the ORE and 
simply instructing them to pay close attention to the features that will differentiate 
other-race faces from one another (Hugenberg et al., 2007; Rhodes et al., 2009). 
Importantly, these results do not arise from a simple increase in global motivation 
to try harder or perform the task better (Hugenberg et al., 2007), which makes these 
findings all the more surprising. The advantages afforded by perceptual expertise 
generally require extensive training to develop, so it is hard to understand how 
merely telling people to perform as experts do on a difficult task would be as 
effective.  
Although it appears that exposure to (and individuation of) other-race faces as well 
as attentional effects stemming from top-down cognitive biases are each capable of 
influencing recognition and memory of other-race faces, what is less clear is the 
extent to which holistic processing is affected by either of these factors. Several 
studies investigating perceptual expertise have demonstrated the limits of the 
  
   19 
generalizability of processing strategies to objects that are distant members of a 
trained category. For example, although structurally very similar (and technically 
members of the same basic-level category), holistic processing and discrimination 
improvements associated with modern car expertise do not generalize to antique 
cars (Bukach et al., 2010). Thus, it is possible for stimuli to share certain perceptual 
and conceptual features (as in the case of same-race and other-race faces) yet elicit 
different processing strategies. Similarly, McGugin et al., (2011) reported enhanced 
discrimination performance following individuation training limited solely to the 
race participants had been trained to individuate, suggesting that racial differences 
between faces may be sufficiently salient to disrupt generalization of processing 
strategy.  
Even though there are claims that other-race faces elicit reduced holistic processing, 
the paradigms used to support this conclusion are either not well suited for 
measuring holistic processing specifically or have used the partial design version of 
the composite task (Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Caldara, & Rossion, 2006; 
Michel et al., 2007; Michel, Rossion, et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989; Rhodes, 
Hayward, & Winkler, 2006; Tanaka et al., 2004), which makes interpreting the 
results very difficult. To date, no studies investigating the link between the ORE and 
holistic processing have been published using the complete design, which is 
arguably the task for which the strongest case for construct validity has been made 
(Cheung et al., 2008; McGugin et al., submitted; Richler, Cheung & Gauthier, 
2011a, 2011b; Richler, Mack, et al., 2011). This same problem also plagues 
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findings arguing that, independent of low-level perceptual factors, top-down factors 
can modulate holistic processing.  While there is some evidence that manipulating 
group and social status can produce differences in holistic processing for same-race 
faces (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Ratcliff, Hugenberg, Shriver, & Bernstein, 
2011), these results have only been demonstrated using the partial design, so their 
validity is unclear. As discussed earlier, the measure through which holistic 
processing is inferred in the complete design is impervious to manipulations of 
strategy (Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011b; Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 2011). 
Instead, as would be expected, changes in strategy are reflected in criterion shifts. 
However, the alignment effect in the partial design is often correlated with changes 
in criterion, because inherent bias confounds make it impossible to measure 
perceptual processing on its own. Changes in strategy are reflected in criterion 
shifts, which are often reflected in the alignment effect. Central to this dissertation 
is the question of whether other-race and same-race faces vary in the type of 
processing or the amount of holistic processing they elicit, as well as the extent to 
which holistic processing is susceptible to top-down cognitive sets. 
 
Time is of the Essence 
Another important dimension to consider when investigating visual processing is 
time. Picking a single time point has the same pitfalls as averaging a large sample 
of data: important and interesting variance may be lost. Consequently, a single 
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value may not accurately reflect a dynamic process. Moreover, expertise effects 
can arise not only in terms of the mechanism by which an object is processed, but 
also in terms of temporal advantages in the onset or rate of information acquisition. 
For example, Curby & Gauthier (2009) compared the timecourse of visual 
information extraction between novices and experts. Although the rate of 
perceptual processing was largely unaffected by object expertise, an important 
difference was found when examining the shorter encoding durations. Specifically, 
expertise appeared to afford participants a “head start”, whereby less time was 
required for expert observers to acquire sufficient information to accurately identify 
a stimulus, in large part because this diagnostic information begins to accumulate 
earlier for experts. This critical insight that expertise speeds up the onset of 
recognition would not have been possible if Curby & Gauthier had neglected to 
include a range of stimulus durations, particularly at the shorter end of the 
spectrum. If the ORE results from reduced expertise with other-race faces, it may be 
that more time is needed before there is sufficient information available to 
successfully individuate faces.  
Expertise has also been shown to affect not only the appearance of holistic 
processing, but its onset and timecourse as well. As with other-race faces, it has 
been hotly debated whether inverted faces differ from upright faces on a qualitative 
or quantitative basis. A recent study conducted by Richler, Mack et al. (2011) used 
the complete design to directly measured holistic processing over time for both 
upright and inverted faces. By sampling a variety of stimulus durations, Richler and 
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colleagues found that with upright faces, holistic processing was evident at all 
tested time points, even when the test composite face was only presented for 50 ms. 
With inverted faces, however, holistic processing required time to emerge, not 
appearing until 183 ms, and then continued to increase such that there was no 
difference in the magnitude of holistic processing between upright and inverted 
faces at later time points. Clearly then, time matters, as different conclusions about 
holistic processing and inverted faces could be drawn. Looking at the shortest 
duration, one would likely conclude that inverted faces fail to elicit holistic 
processing at all, which suggests they must be processed in a qualitatively different 
fashion from upright faces. However, examining the longest time point, the exact 
opposite is concluded: inverted faces are processed just as holistically as upright 
faces. By looking at the timecourse, the difference between inverted and upright 
faces is revealed to be a quantitative one; holistic processing is delayed and more 
time is required for information to accumulate for inverted faces.  
What if, as Richler, Mack et al. (2011) found, the difference between other-race 
and same-race faces is not the type of mechanism used (Michel et al., 2006; 
Rhodes et al., 1989; Tanaka et al., 2004), but rather one of degree or efficiency? 
Perhaps other-race faces are processed holistically, but because of subtle structural 
differences between other-race and same-race faces, holistic processing strategies 
are more poorly generalized thereby requiring additional time for holistic 
processing to fully emerge. If this is the case, then only looking at a very early or 
very late timepoint in the processing stream would make it impossible to know to 
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what extent, and in what capacity, holistic processing for other-race and same-race 
faces truly varies.  
There are several interesting neurophysiological findings supporting a quantitative 
difference between other-race and same-race faces. Various ERP studies have 
examined how other-race faces affect the N170, a component observed over 
occipitotemporal areas that is believed to be associated with face detection and/or 
early face processing prior to explicit identification (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & 
McCarthy, 1996; Bentin & Deouell, 2000). Because the N170 is generally delayed 
and amplified when faces are inverted, this has been taken as evidence that the 
N170 reflects configural processing (Latinus & Taylor, 2006).The N170 is delayed 
for other-race faces as compared to same-race faces, suggesting that holistic 
processing may be postponed for faces of less familiar races (Stahl, Wiese, & 
Schweinberger, 2008; Wiese, Stahl, & Schweinberger, 2009). Moreover, when 
directly comparing other-race and inverted faces, Wiese and colleagues found that 
the delay in the N170 was comparable for other-race and inverted faces, and these 
two effects were additive. This suggests that our relative difficulties with both 
inverted and other-race faces may actually stem from the same source, namely that 
holistic processing is deployed less efficiently for both. Another goal of the studies 
conducted in this dissertation is to examine how the timecourse of holistic 





This dissertation describes a series of experiments aimed at addressing one 
fundamental question: how does race influence holistic processing? To-date, this 
seemingly straightforward question has proved uncannily difficult to answer. It has 
been argued that our poorer recognition memory for other-race faces stems from 
fundamental differences in how they are processed; however, while some evidence 
exists that other-race faces exhibit reduced holistic and configural processing 
(Hancock & Rhodes, 2008; Michel, Caldara, et al., 2006; Michel et al., 2007; 
Michel, Rossion, et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989, 2006; Tanaka et al., 2004) and 
instead rely upon more feature-based recognition mechanisms, the use of flawed 
designs and suboptimal methods has cast doubt onto the validity of these claims. 
Thus, Experiment 1 uses the complete design of the composite task to directly test 
the claim that holistic processing is reduced for other-race faces relative to same-
race faces. Experiment 2 provides additional insight into the interplay between race 
and holistic processing by taking the factor of time into consideration, exploring the 
possibility that other-race faces may be processed less efficiently than same-race 
faces. Following the rationale of Richler, Mack et al., (2011) who found that 
inverted faces require additional time for holistic processing to fully emerge, I 
explored the possibility that this might also be true for other-race faces. If so, this 
would indicate that, like inverted faces, the difference in processing between other-
race and same-race faces is quantitative rather than qualitative in nature.   
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As discussed earlier, explanations of the ORE have not been limited to those rooted 
in low-level perceptual learning. Another alternative is that when we see other-race 
faces, we quickly categorize them as “other” and assign them “outgroup” status. 
The Categorization-Individuation Model argues that separating faces into outgroups 
and ingroups can cognitively bias us to attend to the simpler features used for 
basic-level categorization (i.e., race) in the case of the former versus the subtler 
features useful for more demanding subordinate-level (i.e., individual identity) 
recognition in the case of the latter (Hugenberg et al., 2010).  Moreover, this model 
posits that even when one has considerable perceptual expertise with a racial 
subset of faces, individuation is always more difficult than basic-level 
categorization, so even with same-race faces, the motivation to individuate is 
critical for determining whether a recognition (or even holistic processing) 
advantage is observed for same-race faces. Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to 
evaluate the Categorization-Individuation Model account of the ORE, specifically 
testing whether explicitly categorizing faces as coming from an outgroup would 
reduce holistic processing. 
When using other-race faces there are both low-level perceptual and high-level 
cognitive factors at work that are impossible to tease apart. Thus the studies 
focusing specifically on the influence of top-down cognitive sets and 
ingroup/outgroup categorization on face recognition and holistic processing have 
been restricted to same-race faces so that perceptual expertise is held constant 
across the ingroup and outgroup faces. Manipulating group status of faces on the 
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basis of university affiliation can produce a recognition deficit for outgroup same-
race faces similar to the ORE (Hugenberg et al., 2007), and the partial design 
version of the composite task was used in a study reporting that the magnitude of 
holistic processing is also reduced under these conditions (Hugenberg & Corneille, 
2009). Accordingly, Experiments 3 and 4 use the complete design to investigate the 
extent to which outgroup categorization alone can affect holistic processing, as 
well as the timescale at which these effects might emerge. Even if outgroup 
categorization can reduce holistic processing, it may be that top-down cognitive 
biases are not evident early on but require time to be observed.  
The following experiments will show that contrary to claims that other-race and 
same-race faces are processed qualitatively differently, at least some other-race 
faces are processed as holistically as same-race faces (Chapter 2). Instead, it 
appears that the difference between other-race and same-race faces is more likely 
to be quantitative in nature. Examining the timecourse of the ORE revealed that 
holistic processing can be reduced for other-race faces, however, unlike inversion, 
the effect of race on holistic processing requires time to emerge (Chapter 3). 
Moreover, the ORE can also emerge in terms of an overall discrimination 
advantage for same-race faces that develops quickly and is independent of 
differences in holistic processing. Because holistic processing develops over time, 
and the durations sampled were rather limited, if there is a difference in holistic 
processing between other-race and same-race faces, it is likely that it is with 
respect to how early it arises, not whether it does in fact arise. Finally, top-down 
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categorization does not affect holistic processing, although it may provide ingroup 
faces with an overall performance advantage that is evident early on (Chapter 4). 
Together these experiments demonstrate that other-race faces can be processed 
holistically, and there is little evidence that differences in how other-race and 
same-race faces are processed are anything but quantitative in nature. Moreover, 
both bottom-up perceptual factors as well as top-down cognitive biases can 
contribute to the ORE in terms of discrimination advantages for same-race and 
ingroup faces, whereas differences in holistic processing were less commonly 
observed. Thus, the ORE itself is unlikely to arise from differences in holistic 







DO OTHER-RACE FACES ELICIT REDUCED HOLISTIC PROCESSING? 
 
Experiment 1: Investigating Holistic Processing for Same- and Other-Race Faces 
using the Complete Design 
The other-race effect (ORE) is a robust phenomenon in which faces of unfamiliar 
races (referred to as other-race faces) are less well recognized and remembered 
than faces of the same-race faces as the observer (Meissner & Brigham, 2001). 
Although the ORE is well-established, it is less clear what mechanisms give rise to 
this effect.  
Holistic processing plays an important role in the recognition of same-race faces 
(Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier 2011a), so it has been suggested that holistic 
processing may be reduced or absent for other-race faces, which ultimately impairs 
recognition. Although many different tasks have been used to investigate this 
question, as was discussed in Chapter 1, the best method we currently have for 
assessing and measuring holistic processing is the composite task. Unfortunately, 
few studies have employed the composite task to compare holistic processing for 
other-race versus same-race faces, and those that have done so have used the 
flawed partial design (Michel et al., 2006; Michel, Corneille & Rossion, 2007). 
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Consequently, it is unclear whether holistic processing actually differs between 
other-race and same-race faces. 
Thus, the primary goal of Experiment 1 is to assess whether other-race faces are 
processed holistically, and if so, whether they are processed less holistically than 
same-race faces. Traditionally, the ORE is generally demonstrated using a memory 
task in which participants study a series of faces and then are later asked to identify 
the faces that they previously viewed (see Meissner & Brigham, 2001 for review). 
Here, only the composite task is used to assess the perceptual processing of other-
race and same-race faces without a long-term memory component. Even though 
the “traditional” ORE is not being directly measured here, if differences in holistic 
processing arise, it is reasonable to presume that subsequent face recognition, 
whether measured through the Cambridge Face Memory Test (Duchaine & 
Nakayama, 2006) or using the memory task traditionally used to assess the ORE, 
would also be affected (e.g., Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011a). 
On the composite task, holistic processing is defined as a failure of selective 
attention that is indexed by a congruency x alignment interaction. In addition to 
holistic processing, which is reflected in a difference score, overall discriminability 
of same-race and other-race faces can be assessed by averaging across all 
congruency and alignment conditions and would be reflected as an interaction 
between face race and participant race. Enhanced holistic processing for same-race 
faces relative to other-race faces would in and of itself be evidence of an ORE. 
However, the composite task might also reveal an ORE in terms of differences in 
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overall discriminability for matching judgments on parts of same-race and other-
race faces. If we are more sensitive to and better able to encode the subtle 
differences between same-race faces, this would result in improved recognition and 
subsequent memory for same-race faces as is seen in the traditional ORE. Relatively 
brief experience individuating other-race faces can enhance one’s sensitivity to 
differences between other-race faces of the trained race (McGugin et al., 2011), so 
it may be that our individuation experience with same-race faces first asserts itself 
as a discrimination advantage for same-race faces, which then gives rise to 
enhanced same-race memory. Despite this prediction, McGugin and colleagues 
did not observe an improvement in recognition memory, even though 
discriminability for trained-race other-race faces improved on a two-alternative 
forced choice task following individuation training. However, it is possible that this 
is because they used the discrimination task as the study phase of their recognition 
task, which may have somehow diminished encoding. Additionally, their training 
was very short, so it is possible that perceptual effects may arise and be more easily 
discerned before differences in recognition memory are evident. In contrast, 
lengthier training paradigms have improved recognition performance using the 








Sixty-four participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in 
this experiment. Half of these participants were Caucasian individuals (20 female; 
age range 18 – 33; mean age 23.12) recruited from the Vanderbilt community, who 
were provided with either monetary compensation or course credit for their time. 
The remaining 32 participants were Asian individuals recruited from the University 
of Hong Kong community, who were provided with paid compensation for their 
participation.  Age and gender was not recorded because of experimenter error, 
however, the Hong Kong sample was similar to the sample from Vanderbilt.  
 
Stimuli 
A total of 80 gray-scale faces (20 Asian Adult Male, 20 Asian Adult Female, 20 
Caucasian Adult Male, 20 Caucasian Adult Female) were used to create the 
composite stimuli used in this experiment. Prior to manipulation of the images, all 
faces were cropped so that the hair, ears and neck were eliminated. For each Race 
x Gender condition, face images were split in half to create 20 face tops and 20 
face bottoms.  The top halves of ten of these faces were selected and paired with 
the bottom halves of the remaining ten faces in order to form composite faces. For 
each condition, a total of 56 composite faces were created: 28 where the tops and 
bottoms were aligned, and 28 where the tops and bottoms were misaligned. Within 
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each set of 28 faces, composites were selected in pairs for the main experiment so 
that there were at least two composites that shared the same top half (but not the 
same bottom), and at least two composites shared the same bottom half (but not the 
same top) within each block. Misaligned faces were created by moving the top half 
of the face to the right by 50% of its width, while the bottom half of the face was 
moved to the left by 50% of its width so that the edge of one face half fell in the 
center of the other face half. A black line bisected the top and bottom halves along 
the horizontal plane to make it clear where the top half ended and the bottom half 
began.  Aligned faces were 219 pixels wide, while misaligned faces were 340 
pixels wide; all face images were 299 pixels tall. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was run using Superlab Pro 1.75 on Apple computers running OS 
9. 
Each trial (see Figure 1) began with the presentation of a fixation cross (300 ms), 
followed by a brief blank screen (200 ms). An initial composite face was then 
presented (600 ms) followed by a blank screen (300 ms) and then a second 
composite face (3000 ms max). While this second face was presented, participants 
responded whether its top half was the Same (“Q” key) or Different (“P” key) as the 
top half of the first face. Making a response initiated the next trial. If participants 
failed to respond while the second face was on screen, the trial was discarded from 
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analyses and the next trial automatically began. Given that participants had 3000 
ms to make their response, trial time-outs were extremely rare. 
 
 
Figure 1. Timing of events in Experiment 1. The top row displays an example of a 
Caucasian-Aligned trial and the bottom row presents an example of an Asian-Misaligned 
trial. Participants were instructed to indicate whether the top halves of the two sequentially 
presented faces were the same or different. Note that in Experiment 1, both the study and 
test composite face was misaligned on Misaligned trials. 
 
Participants completed five blocks, each consisting of 72 trials. Stimuli were 
blocked by race and alignment, such that within a given block, participants only 
viewed faces of one race (either Asian or Caucasian), and all of these faces shared 
the same alignment (either Aligned or Misaligned). As such, the four experimental 
blocks were as follows: Asian faces-Aligned; Asian faces-Misaligned; Caucasian 
faces-Aligned; Caucasian faces-Misaligned. At the start of the experiment, one of 
these blocks was randomly selected and used as a practice block so that 
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participants could familiarize themselves with the task and response production. 
The order of the five blocks was randomized for each participant. 
Within each block, there were nine trials for each combination of gender 
(male/female), correct response (same/different) and congruency 
(congruent/incongruent). In the final analyses, data was collapsed across gender, 




To limit the effect of outliers, winsorized (20%) means and variances were used in 
all analyses, following recommendations for robust estimation by Wilcox (2005).  
 
Sensitivity (d’) 
 Sensitivity (d’) for Caucasian and Asian participants is plotted in Figure 2. To calculate d’, hits 
were defined as trials on which participants correctly identified that the face halves were the 
same, and false alarms were trials where the two halves differed but participants erroneously 
said they were the same. 
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA on d’ with factors Congruency 
(congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), Face Race (Caucasian/Asian) and 
Participant Race (Caucasian/Asian) revealed that performance was significantly better on 
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congruent vs. incongruent trials (F1,62 = 494.9, p < 0.0001), on misaligned vs. aligned trials 




Figure 2. Sensitivity (d’) results for Caucasian (a), Asian (b), and both groups participants 
averaged together (c) using the complete design. Congruent trials are presented in blue, 
and incongruent trials are presented in orange. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals 
of within-subject effects. 
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Critically, there was a significant Congruency x Alignment interaction (F1,62 = 234.5, 
p <0.0001), the hallmark of holistic processing. However, the Congruency x 
Alignment x Face Race x Participant Race interaction was not significant (F1,62  = 
3.09, p = 0.084), indicating that the amount of holistic processing did not differ 
between same-race and other-race faces. As can be seen in Figure 3, the size of the 
Congruency x Alignment interaction, which measures holistic processing in this 
task, was not significantly different for same-race and other-race faces for either 
Caucasian or Asian participants. In addition, the Face Race x Participant Race 
interaction was not significant (F1,62  = 2.69, p = 0.11) indicating that same-race 
and other-race faces were equally discriminable in this task.  
  
 
Figure 3. Holistic processing (as measured in terms of the congruency x alignment 
interaction in d’) for same-race and other-race faces for Caucasian (a)  and Asian (b) 
participants. The magnitude of the interaction between congruency and alignment was 
calculated using the following formula: (d’ on Congruent Aligned trials – d’ on Incongruent 
Aligned trials) – (d’ on Congruent Misaligned trials – d’ on Incongruent Misaligned trials). 
Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of within-subject effects. 
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Correct Response Time (RT) 
 
 
Figure 4. Response times for correct trials for Caucasian (a), Asian (b), and both groups of 
participants averaged together (c). Congruent trials are depicted in blue and incongruent 





Correct RTs are plotted for Caucasian and Asian participants in Figure 4. With 
regards to RT, holistic processing is reflected in longer RTs on incongruent 
compared to congruent trials, and this difference is larger when faces are aligned.  
A similar 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA revealed that correct RTs 
mirrored the d’ data with respect to main effects for Congruency, Alignment and 
their interaction. However, unlike the d’ data, there was no main effect of Face 
Race (F1,62  = 0.0892, p = 0.77), indicating that participants responded equally 
quickly to Caucasian and Asian faces. Thus, the overall discrimination advantage 
seen for Caucasian faces in the d’ data cannot be accounted for in terms of a 
speed-accuracy trade-off. Consistent with the sensitivity data, the four-way 
interaction between Congruency X Alignment X Face Race X Subject Race was not 
significant ((F1,62  = 0.62, p = 0.44). 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 used the complete design version of the composite task to investigate 
the extent to which holistic processing might differ between same-race and other-
race faces. No differences in sensitivity were found between same-race and other-
race faces for either Caucasian or Asian participants, suggesting that there was no 
overall discrimination advantage for same-race faces in this task. Further analyses 
of d’ and reaction times revealed that not only was holistic processing present for 
both types of faces, but other-race and same-race faces did not differ significantly 
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in terms of the amount of holistic processing they elicited. Ultimately, there was 
little evidence for an ORE either in terms of a general discrimination advantage or 
enhanced holistic processing for same-race faces. 
There are several reasons that might explain why Experiment 1 failed to produce 
evidence of an ORE. Overall, discrimination performance was better for Caucasian 
faces, regardless of participant race, which may indicate that the Caucasian faces 
used in this experiment were inherently more salient and heterogeneous than the 
Asian faces. At the very least, if the Caucasian faces were easier to discriminate, 
this may have artificially inflated Asian participants’ performance with other-race 
faces, thereby negating any discrimination advantage that might exist for same-race 
faces for that group. An alternative explanation is that the participants tested here 
were not truly “novices” with respect to the “other race”, as each group is likely to 
have had some experience with both Asian and Caucasian faces. Although this 
experience was certainly less than that with their own race, the difference may not 
have been sufficient to produce an obvious ORE in terms of discriminability or 
holistic processing. Perhaps if one is presented with a race that is exceedingly 
unfamiliar or dissimilar to one’s own, this might not be the case. 
There is another intriguing possibility that could explain the lack of an ORE in the d’ 
data. Experiment 1 used relatively lengthy stimulus durations, particularly in the 
case of the second test face, which was presented for a maximum of three seconds. 
This has two consequences: first, the leisurely timing may have made the task 
insufficiently demanding; performance was quite high on this task, so it is possible 
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that ceiling effects, particularly in the congruent-aligned condition, could be 
obscuring differences in sensitivity for other-race and same-race faces that might 
become evident were the task slightly more difficult. A second consequence of 
these long stimulus presentations is that they potentially obscure any effects of time. 
That is, even if holistic processing does arise for other-race faces, it may have a 
different timecourse compared to same-race faces. Indeed, a recent study by 
Richler, Mack et al., (2011) investigating holistic processing of inverted faces 
concluded that with sufficient exposure duration, inverted faces are processed 
holistically to the same extent as upright faces. In that experiment, holistic 
processing for inverted faces was not apparent at short exposures and did not arise 
until the second face was presented for 183 ms. At this point, the magnitude of 
holistic processing was still smaller for inverted faces as compared to upright faces, 
however, holistic processing continued to increase for inverted faces, and was 
comparable to upright faces by 800 ms. 
Broadly speaking, Experiment 1 provides evidence that holistic processing can and 
does arise for at least some other-race faces, with a magnitude comparable to 
same-race faces. But the question remains as to whether holistic processing occurs 
as quickly and efficiently for other-race faces as it does for same-race faces. 
Holistic processing is often considered automatic, but as Richler, Mack et al., 
(2011) have shown, it may be that when an object of expertise deviates from the 
conditions that form the basis of expertise, more time is required before holistic 
processing arises and reaches its full extent. If this is also true for other-race faces, 
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then differences in holistic processing or discriminability may become apparent 
when examining performance under more limited presentation times. Also, limiting 
stimulus duration will increase task difficulty, thereby avoiding possible ceiling 
effects and increasing sensitivity to the ORE. The possibility that the ORE may arise 






IS HOLISTIC PROCESSING FOR OTHER-RACE FACES LESS EFFICIENT THAN 
FOR SAME-RACE FACES? 
 
Experiment 2: Investigating the Timecourse of Holistic Processing and the ORE 
One explanation for the ORE that has gained a good deal of traction is the expertise 
hypothesis, which suggests that we have a more difficult time recognizing and 
remembering other-race faces because we have less experience individuating them 
(Lebrecht et al., 2009; McGugin et al., 2011; Rhodes et al.,  1989; Tanaka & Pierce, 
2009). However, there has been considerable debate regarding how reduced 
experience with other-race faces may be reflected in perceptual processing. Some 
researchers have suggested that limited contact with other-race faces may result in 
a qualitative difference in how other-race and same-race faces are processed; 
proponents of this theory suggest that while same-race faces are processed 
holistically, other-race faces rely on a feature-based processing strategy (Rhodes et 
al., 1989; Tanaka et al., 2004; Michel, Caldara, et al., 2006; Michel et al., 2006; 
Murray et al., 2003). An alternative possibility, however, is that the difference in 
processing between other-race and same-race faces may be quantitative in nature, 
meaning that both types of faces recruit the same underlying processing 
mechanism (i.e., holistic processing), but due to our lack of familiarity with other-
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race faces, holistic processing may be less efficient than for same-race faces (Stahl 
et al., 2008; Wiese et al., 2009). In sum, qualitative explanations of the ORE dictate 
that other-race faces are processed in a fundamentally different fashion than same-
race faces (i.e., featural vs. holistic processing), whereas a quantitative explanation 
proposes that both face types are processed the same way, though same-race faces 
may be processed more efficiently. 
Investigations into the neural underpinnings of the ORE lend support to the notion 
that it arises due to a quantitative difference in processing between other-race and 
same-race faces. Golby and colleagues (2001) used functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) to investigate the response of the fusiform gyrus to same-race and 
other-race faces. A particular subsection of ventral occipitotemporal cortex is 
known as the fusiform face area (FFA) because it tends to preferentially respond to 
faces compared to other objects (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Tong, 
Nakayama, Moscovitch, Weinrib, & Kanwisher, 2000). However, it may be that 
rather than being specialized for faces, the FFA is instead involved in holistic 
processing and reflects perceptual expertise, as it does respond robustly to objects 
with which participants have considerable individuation experience (Gauthier, 
Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000; Gauthier, Tarr, Anderson, Skudlarski, & Gore, 
1999; Wong., Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009). Golby et al. found that same-race faces 
elicited greater activation in the left FFA than did other-race faces. These results 
suggest that other-race faces recruit the same mechanisms as same-race faces, but 
to a lesser extent. Given the link between holistic processing and FFA activity 
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(Bilalić, Langner, Ulrich, & Grodd, 2011; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Gauthier et al., 
1999; Wong, Palmeri, Rogers, Gore, & Gauthier, 2009), this would suggest that 
other-race faces are processed less holistically than same-race faces. Notably, the 
difference in activation for same-race versus other-race faces in the FFA was 
correlated with the size of the memory advantage for same-race faces over other-
race faces, consistent with the idea that the ORE stems from reduced holistic 
processing. The ERP literature provides further support for a quantitative difference 
in holistic processing, demonstrating that the N170, which is believed to reflect 
configural processing, is delayed for other-race faces, a result that suggests that 
holistic processing for other-race faces emerges later than for same-race faces (Stahl 
et al., 2008; Wiese et al., 2009). Additionally, this delay in the N170 is comparable 
for other-race faces and inverted faces, suggesting that the ORE and the inversion 
effect may have a common underlying basis (Wiese et al., 2009).  
Like other-race faces, it has been suggested that inverted faces are processed via 
different mechanisms than upright faces, specifically that they do not engage 
holistic processing (Goffaux & Rossion, 2006, 2007; Hole, 1994; Michel, Rossion, 
et al., 2006; Rossion & Boremanse, 2008). However, many studies suggest that the 
difference is quantitative (Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004; Richler, Mack, et al., 
2011; Riesenhuber, Jarudi, Gilad, & Sinha, 2004; Sekuler, Gaspar, Gold, & Bennett, 
2004; Valentine & Bruce, 1988). Because there is a decrease in perceptual 
similarity for inverted faces relative to upright faces with which we have more 
experience, it may be that holistic processing is slightly reduced for inverted faces, 
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or simply takes longer to emerge. Specifically, Richler, Mack et al., found that at 
very short stimulus durations, inverted faces failed to elicit holistic processing, 
however, with extended stimulus presentations, holistic processing emerged and 
was similar in magnitude to that observed for upright faces. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that other-race faces can sometimes be processed as 
holistically as same-race faces. However, the stimulus durations in Experiment 1 
were relatively lengthy. If the processing difference between other-race and same-
race faces is merely a question of efficiency, then these long face presentations may 
be unable to reveal real differences in holistic processing that may only be evident 
early on. Previous work has suggested that holistic processing of same-race faces is 
observed as soon as stimulus durations are long enough to support above-chance 
performance (Richler, Mack, et al., 2009). If other-race faces are processed less 
efficiently than same-race faces, then it may be that longer presentation times are 
required for holistic effects to emerge because more time is needed for 
performance to rise above chance. Accordingly, the aim of Experiment 2 was to 
investigate whether, as with the inversion effect, a more robust ORE (exhibited 
through increased discriminability or greater holistic processing for same-race 
faces) might arise early on, but then decrease with time. To address this question, a 
modified version of the composite task from Experiment 1 was used where 
exposure of the test face was titrated so that the timecourse of holistic processing 






Eighty-three participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in 
this experiment. Of these participants, 43 were Caucasian individuals (26 female; 
age range 18 – 54; mean age 22.32) recruited from the Vanderbilt community, who 
were provided with either monetary compensation or course credit for their time. 
The remaining 40 participants were Asian individuals (28 female; age range 18 – 
33; mean age 22.2) recruited from the University of Hong Kong community, who 
were provided with paid compensation for their participation. Two Caucasian 
participants were excluded from the final analyses because they failed to respond 
to over 20% of trials. 
 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was run using Matlab on Apple computers running OS 10.6. 
The sequence of events in this experiment is very similar to Experiment 1 (Figure 5). 
The principal differences between the two experiments are the presentation 
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durations of the study and test composite faces, as well as the introduction of a 
patterned mask between the two. Each trial began with the presentation of a 
fixation cross (500 ms), which was then followed by a study composite face (800 
ms). A mask was then presented (500 ms), after which the test composite face 
appeared for a variable duration of either 50, 183, or 800 ms. A question mark then 
appeared on screen for a maximum duration of 2500 ms, during which participants 
were required to make their response. As in Experiment 1, participants were 
instructed to indicate whether the top halves of the two composite faces they had 
viewed were the Same (“Q” key) or Different (“P” key). Making a response initiated 
the next trial. 
 
 
Figure 5. Timing of events in Experiment 2. Pictured is an example of an Aligned trial with 
Asian faces. When the question mark appeared, participants indicated whether the top 
halves of the two previously viewed faces were the same or different.  
 
One additional difference between Experiment 1 and 2 involves the Misaligned 
trials. In Experiment 1, both study and test composite faces were misaligned on 
Misaligned trials. However, spurious congruency effects can be induced for novel 
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non-face objects when study composites are misaligned, resulting in 
misidentification of holistic processing (Richler, Bukach, et al., 2009). When only 
the test composite is misaligned, holistic processing appears to be correctly 
indexed using the congruency effect. Consequently, it is possible that holistic 
processing may have been artificially inflated for other-race faces in Experiment 1, 
which could potentially explain why no ORE in terms of holistic processing was 
observed. Thus, in Experiment 2 (and all subsequent experiments), only the test 
composite was misaligned on Misaligned trials. 
The specific presentation times for the test composite were selected with reference 
to the refresh-rate of the computer monitors used for testing (60 Hz) and to 
coincide with those used in Richler and colleagues’ (2011) investigation of the 
timecourse of holistic processing for inverted faces. Additionally, 50 ms was 
selected as the minimum duration based on previous research suggesting that for 
upright faces, discrimination performance is not above chance levels for shorter 
durations (Richler, Mack, Gauthier & Palmeri, 2009). 
Participants completed 20 blocks, each consisting of 48 trials for a total of 960 
trials. Twenty trials for each combination of Face Race (Asian/Caucasian), 
Congruency (congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), Correct 
Response (same/different) and Test Duration (50/183/800 ms) were collected. 
Stimuli were blocked by face race, such that participants completed 10 blocks 
consisting exclusively of Caucasian faces, and 10 blocks of Asian faces. These 
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blocks were randomly intermixed. All other factors (congruency, alignment, correct 
response, test composite presentation duration) were randomized. 
 
Results 
In this experiment, the presentation duration for the test composite face was 
parametrically manipulated so that I could directly compare and contrast how 
holistic processing develops for same-race and other-race faces. For this reason, it 
was critical to precisely control the exposure of the test composite, and as a result, 
participants were not able to respond until after the test stimulus was removed from 
the screen. By making participants wait until the second composite face was 
removed before they made their response, this helped to ensure that they were 
actually observing and processing the stimuli for the entirety of their allotted 
duration. Reaction times would be difficult to interpret in this experiment because 
an additional decisional component (i.e., determining when it is time to respond) 
must be factored in. Thus, in this experiment, analyses will be restricted to 
accuracy (as measured in terms of d’). 
To limit the effect of possible outliers, winsorized (20%) means and variances were 





d' for Caucasian Subjects 
 
 
Figure 6. Sensitivity (d’) for congruent (blue lines) and incongruent (red lines) trials as a 
function of alignment and stimulus race for Caucasian participants at each of the three 
exposure durations used in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of 
within-subject effects. 
 
Sensitivity (d’) is plotted for each of the three stimulus durations in Figure 6. A 2 x 2 
x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with Congruency 
(congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), Face Race 
(Caucasian/Asian), and Exposure Duration (50/83/800 ms) as the key independent 
variables. There was a significant main effect of Congruency (F1,40  = 151.1, p < 
0.0001) and  Alignment (F1,40  = 19.04, p < 0.0001), as well as a significant 
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interaction between the two (F1,40  = 148.0, p < 0.0001), indicating that holistic 
processing was present. However, there was no significant interaction between 
holistic processing and Face Race (F1,40  = 1.33, p = 0.255), suggesting that for 
Caucasian participants, both Caucasian and Asian faces elicited equal amounts of 
holistic processing.  
With respect to the importance of timing, there was a significant main effect of 
Exposure Duration with a significant improvement in overall discrimination 
performance with increased stimulus presentation (F2,80  = 858.7, p < 0.0001). 
Interestingly, although, there was an overall discrimination advantage for 
Caucasian faces (F1,40  = 87.6, p < 0.0001), this advantage for same-race faces 
required time to emerge: a significant interaction between Exposure Duration and 
Face Race revealed that the discrimination advantage Caucasian participants 
exhibited for Caucasian faces only occurred for stimulus presentations of 183 ms 
and longer (F2,80  = 29.65, p < 0.0001). 
Stimulus exposure duration also influenced holistic processing (F2,80  = 53.6, p < 
0.0001); as can be seen in Figure 6, significant Congruency x Alignment 
interactions were only observed for exposure durations of 183 ms and above (50 
ms: min p = 0.393; 183 ms: max p < 0.0001; 800 ms: max p < 0.0001). Moreover, 
the magnitude of holistic processing present at 183 ms did not differ from the 
magnitude of holistic processing present at 800 ms (F1,39 = 4.083, p = 0.05). 
Critically, the four-way Congruency x Alignment x Face Race x Exposure Duration 
interaction was not significant (F2,80  = 0.746, p =0.48), indicating that holistic 
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processing emerged at the same time and developed at the same rate for both 
same-race and other-race faces. 
 
d' for Asian Subjects 
 
 
Figure 7. Sensitivity (d’) for congruent (blue lines) and incongruent (red lines) trials as a 
function of alignment and stimulus race for Asian participants at each of the three exposure 
durations used in Experiment 2. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of within-
subject effects. 
 
Sensitivity (d’) is plotted for each of the three stimulus durations in Figure 7. As with 
the Caucasian participants, the same 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was 
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conducted and revealed a significant main effect of Congruency (F1,39  = 153.0, p < 
0.0001) and  Alignment (F1,39  = 48.34, p < 0.0001). There was also a significant 
interaction between the two (F1,39  = 173.5, p < 0.0001), indicating that holistic 
processing was present.  
As with Caucasian participants, holistic processing interacted with Exposure 
Duration (F2,78  = 20.26, p < 0.0001), however it did so in a different way. Although 
holistic processing for both groups increased with time, for the Caucasian 
participants, it was an “all or none” improvement, where stimulus exposure 
affected whether holistic processing was observed, but once it was present, it did 
not increase in magnitude with longer presentation times. For Asian participants, 
however, holistic processing was evident for both other-race and same-race faces 
even at the shortest presentation duration (min t(39) = 3.721, max p < 0.005), and 
continued to increase with longer stimulus duration (max p < 0.0005). The most 
likely explanation for this difference is that processing was simply faster for Asian 
participants. 
Additionally, in stark contrast to Caucasian participants, a significant interaction 
between Congruency, Alignment and Face Race was also observed (F1,39  = 5.72, p 
< 0.05), indicating that same-race and other-race faces elicited different amounts of 
holistic processing. Paired t-tests demonstrated a clear ORE: the Congruency x 
Alignment interaction was indeed larger for Asian faces (t(39) = 2.394, p < 0.05), 
indicating that Asian participants processed same-race faces more holistically than 
other-race faces. However, the interaction between holistic processing and Face 
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Race was modulated by stimulus exposure (F2,78  = 6.99, p < 0.005), and post-hoc 
tests revealed that this relative boost in holistic processing for same-race faces took 
time to emerge, as it did not appear until 800 ms (50 ms: p = 0.645, 183 ms: p = 
0.631; 800 ms: p < 0.0001). 
While Caucasian participants did not demonstrate differential holistic processing 
for same-race and other-race faces, they did exhibit an overall discrimination 
advantage for same-race faces once holistic processing was present. For Asian 
participants, discrimination improved with each increase in stimulus duration (F2,78  
= 489.5, p < 0.0001), however there was no overall discrimination advantage for 
either same-race or other-race faces (F1,39 = 0.078, p =0.78). Instead, Face Race and 
Exposure Duration interacted (F2,78  = 25.972, p < 0.0001), such that there was an 
early discrimination advantage for same-race faces (p < 0.0001), which ultimately 
switched to a discrimination advantage for  
Caucasian faces at 800 ms (p < 0.005). The early same-race advantage for Asian 
participants is particularly critical because it suggests that these results cannot be 
entirely explained by a stimulus-based advantage that might make the Caucasian 





Figure 8. Plots of overall discrimination performance (blue; right axis) and magnitude of 
holistic processing (orange; left axis) for same-race and other-race faces across the three 
stimulus exposure durations. Overall discrimination performance was calculated by 
averaging across the four congruency x alignment conditions for each face race at each of 
the three time points, and size of the congruency x alignment interaction represents the 
amount of holistic processing. Caucasian participants (top) show an overall discrimination 
advantage for same-race faces that arises with time, whereas Asian participants (bottom) 
initially show a same-race discrimination advantage early on, and enhanced holistic 
processing for same-race faces with extended stimulus exposure. Error bars show 95% 




The primary goal of Experiment 2 was to assess how the ORE emerges when 
participants are given varying amounts of time to process the second composite in 
the composite task. In particular, the aim here was to investigate whether, like 
inverted faces, other-race faces are processed less efficiently than same-race faces 
and may therefore require more time for holistic processing to fully emerge. 
First and foremost, Experiment 2 provided clear evidence that the ORE can, and 
does, assert itself in different ways. As can be seen in Figure 8, while holistic 
processing of same-race faces ultimately reached higher levels than for other-race 
faces for Asian participants, this was not true for Caucasian participants, for whom 
holistic processing of same-race and other-race faces was always equivalent.  
Instead, the ORE for Caucasian participants was reflected in an overall 
discrimination advantage for same-race faces that was apparent as soon as holistic 
processing was observed. This same-race discrimination advantage was also seen 
for Asian participants at the 50 ms exposure duration. This advantage in particular 
is important because results from Experiment 1 indicated that the Caucasian 
stimulus set may have been more easily discriminated; however, Asian participants 
showed a performance advantage for Asian faces early on, while Caucasian 
participants demonstrated a discrimination bias for Caucasian faces, which 
indicates that more than stimulus-based differences are at play. Rather, it appears 
that there may be a fast-acting attentional bias that boosts discrimination 
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performance for same-race faces early on, independent of subsequent changes in 
holistic processing related to face race. 
With respect to whether holistic processing takes longer to develop and emerge for 
other-race faces, the results from Experiment 2 indicate that this is not the case. 
Across both groups of participants, holistic processing appeared at the same time 
and was comparable for same-race and other-race faces even when stimulus 
exposure was extremely brief; it was only at the longer stimulus duration that an 
increase in holistic processing was observed for same-race faces, and this was 
limited to the Asian participants. These results indicate that if reduced holistic 
processing plays a role in the ORE at all, the difference only seems to be evident 
when presentation times are relatively long. This is very different from what is 
observed with inverted faces where increased presentation time results in increased 
holistic processing (Richler, Mack et al., 2011). Two important conclusions can be 
drawn as a result: 1) other-race faces are processed holistically, suggesting that they 
are not processed qualitatively differently from same-race faces; 2) there can be 
quantitative differences in holistic processing between other-race and same-race 
faces, but these are not due to holistic processing emerging earlier or developing at 
a faster rate for same-race faces.  
It is not entirely clear why only one participant group exhibited reduced holistic 
processing for other-race faces. However, one thing that it is important to keep in 
mind is that it is impossible to equate the amount and type of experience each of 
the two groups had with their respective “other race” prior to the experiment, so 
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the perceptual strategies they had developed for other-race versus same-race faces 
could very well differ on that basis. That said, another important factor to consider 
is that it is also difficult to understand what social implications the respective other-
race faces hold for each of the groups: an Asian face may mean something very 
different to a Caucasian individual in Nashville, TN than does a Caucasian face to 
an Asian individual in Hong Kong.  
Given that differences in holistic processing based on race (provided they exist) 
seem to emerge relatively late, it is possible that top-down sociocognitive 
judgments are largely driving this effect. However, in standard other-race studies 
where different races are contrasted with one another, it is impossible to tease apart 
and pinpoint the distinct contributions of low-level perceptual factors from those 
related to top-down biases regarding other-race faces. Experiments 3 and 4 were 
conducted to directly isolate the effect social judgments can have on holistic 










Experiment 3: Investigating the Effects of Explicit Ingroup/Outgroup 
Categorization on Holistic Processing over Time  
Although the perceptual expertise explanation for the ORE has gained a good deal 
of popularity, there are some findings that are not well accounted for in its scope. 
In particular, studies that have controlled for the effects of perceptual learning have 
found that ORE-type effects can be found following manipulations that encourage 
participants to view same-race faces as belonging to social ingroups or outgroups 
(Bernstein et al., 2007; Shriver et al., 2008; Young et al., 2010). These results have 
prompted alternative theories, which argue that sociocognitive factors can largely 
account for the ORE. One such example is the Categorization-Individuation Model 
(Hugenberg et al., 2010; Young et al., 2012), which attempts to bridge the divide 
between the two schools of thought. Proponents of this model argue that there is an 
asymmetrical search for features in other-race and same-race faces, with 
individuals encoding those features that are most useful for individuation for same-
race faces, but only attending to the features that define category membership (i.e., 
race) for other-race faces at the expense of those that support individuation 
(Hugenberg, Miller, & Claypool, 2007; Levin, 1996, 2000; MacLin & Malpass, 
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2001; Young & Hugenberg, 2012). However, by simply manipulating one’s 
motivation to individuate, they argue that the recognition advantage for same-race 
faces (and disadvantage for other-race faces) can be augmented or eliminated. 
The motivation to individuate can be achieved through explicit instructions, such 
as by informing participants about the ORE and the importance of individuation 
(Hugenberg et al., 2007; Rhodes et al., 2009). It also appears, however, that 
motivation to individuate can be implicitly manipulated by categorizing faces into 
ingroups and outgroups, or by making group memberships salient (Bernstein et al., 
2007; Hugenberg et al., 2007; Levin, 1996, 2000). Because racial categorization 
happens relatively quickly (Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005), it is believed that when we 
identify a face as belonging to a race that is saliently different from our own, it is 
then also considered to belong to an outgroup (Levin, 2000). Consequently, the 
motivation to individuate may decrease and the category-defining features are 
encoded instead, resulting in the ORE. 
Recently, it has been suggested that the reason why ingroup/outgroup classification 
matters is because it directly influences the extent to which faces are processed 
holistically (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009). However, as mentioned earlier, it is 
unclear to what extent holistic processing can actually be influenced by top-down 
factors as the effect of group has only been demonstrated using the partial design of 
the composite task. These results are rather surprising, given that holistic processing 
is considered to be a fast, automatic process (Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011b). 
Holistic processing can be modulated by low-level manipulations of general 
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attentional biases, such as by activating biases toward global or local processing 
with Navon letter tasks (Gao, Flevaris, Robertson, & Bentin, 2011). Additionally, 
negative mood has been reported to enhance processing of local features (Basso, 
Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996; Derryberry & Reed, 1998) as compared to positive or 
neutral moods. Similarly, induction of a positive mood reduces the ORE (Johnson & 
Frederickson, 2005) and has recently been shown to increase holistic processing 
measured with the composite task (Curby, Johnson, & Tyson, 2012). Holistic 
processing can also be reduced via competition for processing resources, such as 
when car experts complete a version of the composite task where face and car 
trials are interleaved (Gauthier, Curran, & Curby, 2003). Here the reduction in 
holistic processing appears to result from faces and expert objects tapping into a 
shared, but limited, resource that operates early and likely supports perceptual 
processing (e.g., McGugin, McKeeff, Tong, & Gauthier, 2011; McKeeff, McGugin, 
Tong, & Gauthier, 2010). To date, there is no evidence using the complete design 
of the composite task that holistic processing can be manipulated through more 
top-down, strategic factors. However, if the partial design results indicating that 
ingroup/outgroup categorization can alter holistic processing are valid (Hugenberg 
& Corneille, 2009), this might explain why the difference in holistic processing that 
was observed for Asian participants for same-race and other-race faces in 
Experiment 2 only appeared with longer stimulus durations. Top-down regulation 
of holistic processing (especially where group membership varies on a trial-by-trial 
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basis) likely takes time to emerge, as categorization must first occur and then 
feedback signals must propagate to early visual areas. 
As in Experiments 1 and 2, the experiments in this chapter will be conducted using 
the complete design version of the composite task. The complete design and partial 
design do not always produce compatible results (see Richler & Gauthier, 
submitted), and there are instances when a congruency x alignment interaction is 
observed in the complete design, implying holistic processing is present, yet there 
is no alignment effect in the partial design, such as when investigating the question 
of whether inverted faces elicit holistic processing (Richler, Mack et al., 2011). 
Moreover, there are instances when a manipulation fails to affect holistic 
processing as measured by the complete design, but is strongly reflected in the 
alignment effect within the partial design (Cheung et al., 2008; Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier, 2011b); in such cases, the results from the partial design generally reflect 
a decisional bias component rather than holistic processing. Because the alignment 
effect is so susceptible to response bias, and this bias itself is idiosyncratic and can 
vary greatly between subject samples, it is often difficult to replicate partial design 
results. Thus, any conclusions drawn from the partial design should be validated 
using other methods. Consequently, I did not begin by attempting to replicate 
Hugenberg & Corneille’s (2009) findings using the partial design; there is already 
ample evidence that the two methods are often inconsistent, and the results of such 
a replication would tell us little about whether these results would bear out using 
the complete design. To put it another way, if the partial design found evidence of 
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putative holistic processing that is not supported in the complete design, my 
assessment of these two methods would lead me every time to assume the partial 
design effect could not be trusted.  
As such, the aim of Experiment 3 was to test whether classifying faces into ingroups 
and outgroups can influence holistic processing as measured via the complete 




Sixty-seven participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in 
this experiment. All participants were Caucasian individuals currently enrolled in 
an undergraduate degree program at Vanderbilt University (37 female; age range 
18 – 23; mean age 20.04). Participants were provided with either monetary 
compensation or course credit for their time.  
 
Stimuli 
A subset of Caucasian faces collected and developed by Tanaka & Pierce (2009) 
were used in this experiment. All faces displayed neutral expressions, and the 
internal face features were placed within a standard face template so that all faces 
had identical hairstyles, face contours and clothing.  
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A total of 60 gray-scale adult male faces were used to create the composite stimuli 
used in this experiment. Twenty of these faces were randomly assigned “ingroup” 
status and twenty were assigned “outgroup” status. The remaining third were 
assigned neutral status and used during the practice phase of the experiment. The 
faces were then split into halves, so that each group (ingroup/outgroup/neutral) had 
a pool of 20 face tops and 20 face bottoms that could be randomly selected and 
combined to form composite faces. Faces were placed on a colored background, 
the color of which was determined by group status: for ingroup composites, the 
face halves were presented on black or yellow backgrounds (counterbalanced 
across subjects), whereas outgroup composites were presented on orange or white 
backgrounds (counterbalanced across subjects). Neutral composites were presented 
on a gray background. These specific colors were selected because they 
correspond to the school colors of Vanderbilt University (ingroup) and The 
University of Tennessee (outgroup), which would hopefully make group affiliation 
of the composite faces more salient. Additionally, the name of the school each 
composite attended was printed in white or black letters (depending on the colored 
background) above the top half of the face. These manipulations of color and text 
are comparable to those used by Hugenberg & Corneille (2009) to examine the 
effect of ingroup/outgroup categorization on holistic processing. 
When combined, faces halves were separated by a line four pixels thick (in the 
same color as the background) so as to make the two halves visually distinct from 
one another. Misaligned faces were created by moving the top half of the face to 
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the right by 50% of its width and the bottom half of the face to the left by 50% of 
its width so that the edge of one face half fell in the center of the other face half. 
Aligned composites were 324 pixels wide, whereas misaligned faces were 405 





Figure 9. Timing of events in Experiment 3. A Misaligned Outgroup trial where the correct 
response is “Same” is shown in the top row, and an Aligned Ingroup trial where the correct 
response is “Different” is shown in the bottom row. Note that as in Experiment 2, only the 
test composite face is misaligned on Misaligned trials. 
 
The experiment was run using Matlab on Apple computers running OS 10.6. 
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Prior to the start of the experiment, participants were informed that they would see 
faces of fellow Vanderbilt students as well as University of Tennessee students. 
They were informed that university affiliation depended on the background color 
that the face was presented upon, and that it would be presented in words above 
the face. They were also told that regardless of university affiliation, they should 
pay close attention to all of the faces. Experiment 3 also differed from Experiment 2 
in terms of stimulus timings. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation 
cross (500 ms), which was then followed by a study composite face (600 ms). A 
mask was then presented (300 ms), after which the test composite face appeared 
for a variable duration of either 33, 83, or 400 ms. A question mark then appeared 
on screen for a maximum duration of 3000 ms, during which time participants 
were required to make their response.  As in previous experiments, participants 
were instructed to always indicate whether the top halves of the two composite 
faces they had viewed were the Same (“Q” key) or Different (“P” key). Making a 
response initiated the next trial. 
The shorter presentation of the study face and the interstimulus mask were used to 
match the timings used by Hugenberg & Corneille (2009). As in Experiment 2, the 
exposure durations of the test composite were selected with reference to the 
refresh-rate of the computer monitors used for testing (60 Hz). In Experiment 2, one 
of the participant groups was already very good at 50 ms, so slightly shorter 
stimulus durations were selected to increase the likelihood that any potential 
differences at early time points would be captured and avoid ceiling effects. 
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Participants completed 20 blocks (plus one additional practice block of 16 trials), 
each consisting of 48 trials for a total of 960 trials. Twenty trials for each 
combination of Group Status (ingroup/outgroup), Congruency 
(congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), Correct Response 
(same/different) and Exposure Duration (50/183/800 ms) were collected. All factors 
were randomized within each block, including Group Status, to mirror the design 
used by Hugenberg & Corneille (2009) as closely as possible. 
 
Results 
As in the previous experiments, winsorized (20%) means and variances were used 
in all analyses, following recommendations for robust estimation by Wilcox (2005). 
A 2 x 2 x 2 x 3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with Congruency 
(congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), Group Status 
(Ingroup/Outgroup), and Exposure Duration (33/83/400 ms) as the main factors of 
interest. There was a main effect of both Congruency (F1,66  = 223.3, p < 0.0001) 
and Alignment (F1,66 = 31.36, p < 0.0001), as well as an interaction between the 
two, indicating that holistic processing was present (F1,66  = 52.8, p < 0.0001). 
Congruency x Alignment also interacted with Exposure Duration (F2,132  = 35.69, p 
< 0.0001): as can be seen in Figure 10, holistic processing was not present at the 
shortest stimulus duration of 33 ms (F1,66,=3.89, p = 0.054) for either group of faces, 
but was present at 83 ms (F1,66,=46.2, p < 0.0001) and 400 ms (F1,66,=64.6, p < 
  
   68 
0.0001). Moreover, holistic processing continued to increase for both groups 
between 83ms and 400 ms (F1,66=10.8, p < 0.005). There was also a main effect of 
Exposure Duration, indicating that overall discrimination performance improved 
with longer stimulus presentations (F2,132  = 215.76, p < 0.0001). 
 
 
Figure 10. Sensitivity (d’) for congruent (blue lines) and incongruent (orange lines) trials as 
a function of alignment and group status (ingroup/outgroup) at each of the three exposure 
durations used in Experiment 3. Error bars show 95% confidence intervals of within-
subject effects. 
 
Critically, there was no significant interaction between Congruency, Alignment and 
Group Status (F1,66  1.952, p = 0.167), indicating that ingroup and outgroup faces 
elicited equivalent amounts of holistic processing. Although there was a significant 
four-way interaction between Congruency x Alignment x Exposure Duration x 
Group Status (F2,132  = 3.43, p < 0.05), suggesting that holistic processing for the 
two groups of faces might differ with time, this can be accounted for by the 33 ms 
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time point. As can be seen in the first panel of Figure 10, neither ingroup nor 
outgroup faces were processed holistically at 33ms, although they did produce 
qualitatively different patterns of results (Congruency x Alignment x Group Status 
interaction at 33 ms: F1,66  = 5.33, p < 0.05). There was a significant congruency x 
alignment interaction for ingroup faces at 33 ms (F1,66=8.41, p < 0.01), but 
performance was no better on aligned congruent trials compared to misaligned 
congruent trials (p = 0.057), suggesting that holistic processing was not present. 
Outgroup faces, on the other hand, showed no significant congruency x alignment 
interaction at this short presentation duration (F1,66=0.094, p = 0.76), which also 
indicates that no holistic process was present.  When analyses were restricted to 
stimulus durations of 83ms (F1,66  =1.42, p = 0.238) and 400 ms (F1,66  =0.824, p = 
0.367), there was no longer a significant interaction between Congruency, 
Alignment and Group Status, indicating that when holistic processing was observed 
in this experiment, it did not differ in degree between ingroup and outgroup faces. 
One interesting, but unexpected, result was a significant main effect of Group 
Status (F1,66  = 59.9, p < 0.0001). That is, participants were better at discriminating 
faces that were randomly assigned ingroup status than those that were assigned 
outgroup status. As can be seen in Figure 11, the performance advantage for 
ingroup faces was present at all time points (max p < 0.05), even when faces were 
presented as briefly as 33 ms. Further investigation of a significant Group Status x 
Exposure Duration interaction (F2,132  = 7.218, p < 0.005) revealed a significant 
increase in performance for ingroup faces with each subsequent exposure duration 
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(max p < 0.0001), whereas performance for outgroup faces only improved when 
face presentation time extended from 83 ms to 400 ms (83 vs 33: p = 0.999; 83 to 
400: p < 0.0001).  
 
 
Figure 11. Overall discrimination performance (d’) for Ingroup (blue line) versus Outgroup 
(orange line) faces across the three stimulus exposure durations. Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals of within-subject effects. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 was designed to test Corneille & Hugenberg’s (2009) claims that 
holistic processing can be reduced merely by categorizing a face into an outgroup. 
Moreover, this experiment extended beyond the original study by examining the 
time at which this effect might arise. Unfortunately, Experiment 3 did not support 
Corneille & Hugenberg’s conclusions: despite using the same group manipulation 
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with increased power owing to a larger sample size, there was no evidence that 
holistic processing differed on the basis of group status. Holistic processing 
appeared at the same time for both ingroup and outgroup faces, and also 
developed at the same rate. Although these results fail to replicate those produced 
by the partial design, they are consistent with previous results indicating that 
holistic processing is robust to top-down strategic influences (Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier, 2011b). 
The failure to find an effect of group status on holistic processing is even more 
striking given that the experiment revealed an overall discrimination advantage for 
ingroup faces. Additionally, these findings are similar to the pattern of results 
observed for Caucasian participants in Experiment 2, where holistic processing did 
not differ between same-race and other-race faces, but same-race faces were better 
discriminated overall. As in the current experiment, the discrimination advantage 
for same-race faces appeared quite early. 
Closer examination of the timecourse of discrimination suggests that group status 
may speed up the rate at which information is extracted from a face, as 
performance improved between 33 and 83 ms for the ingroup faces alone. Because 
the times I sampled are rather coarse, it would be difficult to accurately fit a 
function to the ingroup and outgroup data in order to best compare rates of 
perceptual processing between the two. An alternative is that the speed of 
information accumulation may not differ for ingroup and outgroup faces, but the 
time at which useful information is first available may be earlier for ingroup than 
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for outgroup faces. Curby & Gauthier (2009) found that the rate of perceptual 
encoding is unaffected by expertise, however extraction of perceptual information 
begins sooner for items of expertise. With respect to expertise, this “head start” 
makes sense to some extent because experience will have taught us where to look 
to find the diagnostic information useful for discrimination, so we can be more 
efficient in our extraction of critical visual information. However, in Experiment 3, 
expertise was equated across ingroup and outgroup faces, so any advantage 
afforded to ingroup faces must be the result of top-down biases that boosts 
attention for ingroup faces in a more general fashion.  
 
Experiment 4: Investigating the Effects of Ingroup/Outgroup Categorization with 
Prolonged Stimulus Durations 
Despite carefully replicating Hugenberg & Corneille’s (2009) group manipulation 
and instantiating it in the same fashion, I failed to find that this had an effect on 
holistic processing. This is likely because the alignment effect is notoriously fickle 
because of demonstrated confounds (Cheung et al., 2008; Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier, 2011b; Richler, Mack et al., 2011; see Gauthier & Richler, submitted, for 
a review), so the fact that the complete design results did not replicate those 
obtained with the partial design is not really surprising. However, there is also the 
possibility that a potential difference in holistic processing for ingroup versus 
outgroup faces may require more than 800 ms to appear. Although this may seem 
unlikely, the difference in holistic processing between other-race and same-race 
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faces observed for Asian participants in Experiment 2 did take time to emerge. To 
determine whether this is in fact the case, Experiment 4 used the exact same timing 
parameters as Hugenberg & Corneille’s study where the test composite face was 
presented up to 3000 ms. Additionally, because participants were not allowed to 
immediately respond but instead had to wait for the appropriate response window, 
reaction time data was difficult to measure in the previous experiment. Experiment 
4 placed no restrictions on when participants could respond, meaning that reaction 




Forty-four participants with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in 
this experiment. All participants were Caucasian individuals currently enrolled in 
an undergraduate degree program at Vanderbilt University (31 female; age range 
18 – 22; mean age 19.34). Participants were provided with either monetary 
compensation or course credit for their time. Additionally, all participants who 
participated in Experiment 4 were ineligible from participating in Experiment 3 











Figure 12. Timing of events in Experiment 4. A Congruent Aligned Ingroup trial where the 
correct response is “Same” is shown. 
 
The design and sequence of events in this experiment (Figure 12) was nearly 
identical to that of Experiment 3 and is direct replication of the procedure used by 
Hugenberg & Corneille (2009), with the exception that the additional trials required 
in the complete design of the composite task were included.  The sole difference 
between Experiment 3 and 4 is that in this experiment, rather than precisely 
limiting stimulus exposure and having a separate response window, the test 
composite face was always presented for a maximum of 3000 ms, during which 
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time participants were required to make their response. As in previous experiments, 
participants were instructed to always indicate whether the top halves of the two 
composite faces they had viewed were the Same (“Q” key) or Different (“P” key). 
Making a response initiated the next trial. 
As in Experiment 3, prior to the start of the experiment, participants were informed 
that they would see faces of fellow Vanderbilt students as well as University of 
Tennessee students. They were informed that university affiliation depended on the 
background color that the face was presented upon, and that the university name 
would be presented above the face. They were also told that regardless of 
university affiliation, they should pay close attention to all of the faces.  
Participants completed five blocks (plus one additional practice phase composed of 
eight trials), each consisting of 64 trials for a total of 320 trials. Twenty trials for 
each combination of Group Status (ingroup/outgroup), Congruency 
(congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), and Correct Response 
(same/different) were collected. All factors were randomized within each block, 
including Group Status. 
 
Results 
Winsorized (20%) means and variances were used in all analyses, following 







Figure 13. Sensitivity (d’) for congruent (blue lines) and incongruent (orange lines) trials as 
a function of alignment and group status (ingroup/outgroup). Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals of within-subject effects. 
 
Sensitivity (d’) is plotted in Figure 13. A 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA with 
factors Congruency (congruent/incongruent), Alignment (aligned/misaligned), and 
Group Status (ingroup/outgroup) revealed a main effect for Congruency (F1,43  = 
109.7, p < 0.0001), as well as significant interaction between Congruency x 
Alignment (F1,43  = 26.74, p < 0.0001), indicating the holistic processing was 
present. Additionally, there was a main effect of Group Status (F1,43  = 4.31, p < 
0.05), whereby ingroup faces were discriminated better than outgroup faces. 
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However, Group Status did not interact with holistic processing (F1,43 = 0.5068, p 
=0.48), failing to replicate the findings of Corneille & Hugenberg (2009) where 
ingroup faces elicited more holistic processing than outgroup faces. 
 
Correct Response Time (RT) 
  
 
Figure 14. Correct response times for congruent (blue lines) and incongruent (orange lines) 
trials as a function of alignment and group status (ingroup/outgroup). Error bars show 95% 
confidence intervals of within-subject effects. 
 
A similar 2 x 2 x 2 repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on mean correct 
response time. As can be seen in Figure 14, the response time data largely mirrored 
the d’ results, however there were a few key differences. There was a significant 
main effect of Alignment (F1,43 = 7.79, p <0.01), but the effect of Group Status was 
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only marginally significant (F1,43 = 3.22, p =0.08), indicating that there was, at best, 
only a small ingroup advantage in reaction time but certainly no speed-accuracy 
tradeoff. Critically, the response time data corroborated the lack of a Congruency x 
Alignment x Group Status interaction (F1,43 = 0.290, p =0.59), which also failed to 
emerge in the d’ data. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 replicated those of Experiment 3: once again, although 
an overall discrimination advantage was observed for ingroup faces, a similar 
holistic processing advantage was not. Thus, even though the parameters used 
were identical to those of Hugenberg & Corneille (2009), I failed to find evidence 
that ingroup and outgroup categorization affects holistic processing when 
examining d’ or correct response time and when holistic processing is measured 
with the complete design of the composite task.  
This failure to replicate was consistent regardless of whether the current data were 
analyzed in terms of the complete design or the partial design. Given how much 
the alignment effect can be influenced by response bias, it is not surprising that this 
measure is unreliable. Not only did I fail to find a larger alignment effect for 
ingroup faces than outgroup faces (F1,43 = 1.02, p = 0.318), but the partial design 
actually failed to produce any alignment effects whatsoever (F1,43 = 2.41, p = 1.28), 
which would be taken as evidence that neither type of face was processed 
holistically at all! This is also an important reminder that there may be a 
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publication bias at play with respect to the alignment effect: studies are generally 
only published when the partial design provides evidence for holistic processing, 
whereas the potentially many instances when it fails to produce such evidence are 
unlikely to be published.  
On another note, Experiments 1 and 2 failed to find consistent evidence that the 
race of a face influences holistic processing. With that in mind, it is not all that 
strange that ingroup and outgroup categorization failed to modulate holistic 
processing on its own, given that social group is presumably encompassed by race 
(Levin, 2000). 
In the end, while it is not possible to definitively explain why the paradigm in 
Experiment 4 worked for Hugenberg & Corneille (2009) but failed to replicate here 
using either the complete or partial designs, the most likely explanation is that the 








First reported nearly a century ago (Feingold, 1914), the ORE continues to captivate 
and puzzle psychologists today. With accessibility to international media and travel 
at its peak, interracial contact is greater than it has ever been; and yet, the ORE 
persists. Despite the numerous studies that have attempted to understand what 
factors give rise to the ORE, it remains bewilderingly difficult to nail down its 
underlying cause. Given the importance of holistic processing in face recognition 
(McGugin et al., submitted; Richler, Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011a), one of the most 
promising possibilities is that our poorer memory for other-race faces may be due 
to differences in terms of how they are processed. Some have argued that this 
difference may be qualitative in nature, with other-race faces relying more greatly 
on feature-based recognition mechanisms like those that subserve object 
processing (Michel et al., 2006; Murray etl., 2003; Rhodes et al., 1989; Tanaka et 
al., 2004). However, another possibility is that the difference between other-race 
and same-race faces is quantitative in nature, such that holistic processing still 
arises for other-race faces but either takes more time to do so or perhaps occurs to 
a lesser extent (Stahl et al., 20008; Wiese et al., 2009).  
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Reduced or less efficient holistic processing has been accounted for by theories 
involving low-level perceptual expertise (Michel et al., 2006; Rhodes et al., 1989; 
Tanaka et al., 2004; Wiese et al., 2009), as well as accounts that emphasize the 
importance of top-down cognitive biases (Hugenberg et al., 2010; Young et al., 
2012). The expertise point of view stems from evidence that experience 
individuating visually-homogenous stimuli gives rise to holistic processing (Bukach 
et al., 2010; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Wong, Palmeri, & Gauthier, 2009). Because 
there are subtle structural differences between faces of different races (Farkas, 
1994), our relative lack of experience individuating other-race faces results in 
diminished (or less effectively deployed) holistic processing. In contrast, recent 
sociocognitive theories have argued that we identify race very quickly (Ito & 
Urland, 2003, 2005), and in so doing, we separate same-race and other-race faces 
into ingroups and outgroups, respectively (Levin, 1996, 2000). This social group 
categorization is thought to affect how faces are processed, with ingroup faces 
eliciting more holistic processing than outgroup faces, irrespective of race 
(Corneille & Hugenberg, 2009). Unfortunately, reduced holistic processing for 
other-race and outgroup faces has only been inferred using the partial design of the 
composite task which has serious validity concerns (see Richler & Gauthier, 
submitted, for an in-depth review). As a result, the fundamental aim of this 
dissertation was to investigate how race might affect the holistic processing of faces 
using an experimental paradigm that has stronger construct validity. 
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Experiments 1 and 2 found that when using the complete design of the composite 
task, other-race faces can elicit holistic processing. Moreover, contrary to results 
from the partial design (Michel et al., 2007; Michel, Rossion, et al., 2006), holistic 
processing of other-race faces was generally comparable to that observed for same-
race faces. Although one group of participants in Experiment 2 did show evidence 
of a holistic-processing-based ORE, the most consistent ORE that I observed was an 
overall discrimination advantage for same-race faces that could not be explained in 
terms of enhanced holistic processing. Together, these experiments demonstrate 
that other-race and same-race faces appear to recruit the same underling 
mechanisms, and any difference between them is likely quantitative in nature.  
When looking at the timecourse of the ORE in Experiment 2, I was surprised to find 
that when differences in holistic processing were observed between other-race and 
same-race faces, these differences took time to emerge and were only apparent at 
later time points. This was unexpected, because work with inverted faces has found 
the opposite pattern: differences in holistic processing between upright and 
inverted faces are observed early on, but disappear with time (Richler, Mack et al., 
2011). If other-race faces are processed less efficiently than same-race faces, one 
would expect a similar pattern. One possible explanation for this discrepancy is 
that the reduced holistic processing that I observed for other-race faces arose due to 
top-down cognitive biases, the effects of which might be slower to evolve and 
become apparent. I tested this possibility in Experiments 3 and 4, but did not find 
any evidence that explicit categorization of faces into social ingroups and 
  
   83 
outgroups had any effect on holistic processing. These findings are consistent with 
previous work demonstrating that holistic processing is a fast, automatic process 
that is robust to top-down manipulations (Richler, Bukach, et al., 2009; Richler, 
Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011b; Richler, Gauthier, et al., 2008; Richler, Mack, et al., 
2009; Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 2011) and contradict earlier partial design results 
suggesting that changes in holistic processing that might give rise to the ORE can 
be accounted for solely in terms of social biases (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009). 
Similar to the same-race faces in Experiments 1 and 2, although no underlying 
changes in holistic processing were observed, ingroup faces benefited from an 
overall discrimination advantage that arose early on. Because low-level perceptual 
differences cannot explain this finding, it appears that sociocognitive factors may 
induce general attentional biases that can contribute to the ORE. 
The conclusion that group membership does not influence holistic processing is 
inconsistent with prior work (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Ratcliff et al., 2011). 
However, it is important to remember that the alignment effect that was used to 
index holistic processing in that work often reflects changes in response bias rather 
than legitimate differences in holistic processing (Cheung et al., 2008; Richler, 
Cheung, & Gauthier, 2011b; Richler, Mack, et al., 2011). Thus, it is possible that 
studies claiming that top-down judgments can influence holistic processing 
(Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; Ratcliff et al., 2011) are merely detecting changes 
in decision criteria rather than true modulation of the underlying perceptual 
mechanism subserving face recognition.  As discussed earlier in this dissertation, 
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there are two types of bias that can potentially contaminate the partial design. It is 
possible to address bias related to changes in alignment by using both same and 
different trials to calculated d’, however this value will still be contaminated by 
differences in criterion related to the congruency of the two halves of the 
composite face. Because “same” trials are always incongruent and “different” trials 
are always congruent, this latter type of bias is inherent to the partial design and 
cannot be removed, even when using signal detection measures. Unfortunately, 
bias related to congruency (or congruency x alignment interactions) cannot be 
measured using the partial design, so it is not possible to determine whether results 
produced using only the partial design are driven by bias. In the present 
experiments, I did not find any notable changes in response bias due to group 
categorization, and this may explain, in part, why I failed to replicate Hugenberg & 
Corneille’s (2009) alignment effect findings when I examined the data from 
Experiments 3 and 4 within the partial design framework, and also why the 
congruency effect was unaffected by group status.  
The results from the preceding studies are consistent with theories like the 
Categorization Individuation Model that claim that both low-level perceptual 
expertise as well as top-down social judgments play a roll in the ORE (Hugenberg 
et al., 2010; Young et al., 2012). However, my results also suggest that the two 
factors may tap into separate mechanisms that ultimately give rise to enhanced 
same-race face recognition and memory. Although I found evidence that ingroup 
versus outgroup categorization can broadly boost attention and produce a fast-
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rising discrimination advantage, there was no evidence that this manipulation had 
any effect on holistic processing; however, Experiment 2 demonstrated that, with 
time, holistic processing differences can sometimes be observed for same-race and 
other-race faces. As there was no evidence that top-down explanations can 
account for this finding, it seems as though a disparity in previous perceptual 
experience with same-race and other-race faces most likely accounts for any 
modulations of holistic processing. This suggests, then, that although both 
sociocognitive biases and low-level expertise may contribute to the ORE, they do 
so in different ways. 
Indeed, given prior work investigating the links between expertise and holistic 
processing, it is somewhat surprising that no consistent difference was found in 
holistic processing between other-race and same-race faces, either in terms of the 
amount of holistic processing observed or the rate at which it appeared. Changes in 
holistic processing routinely follow extensive experience with cars and even novel 
visual objects (Bukach et al., 2010; Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Wong, Palmeri, & 
Gauthier, 2009), and individuation training (which leads to holistic processing) is 
known to improve other-race face recognition (McGugin, Tanaka, et al., 2011; 
Tanaka & Pierce, 2009), so why did same-race faces not show a reliable holistic 
processing advantage in these experiments? 
One possibility is that participants were too familiar with the so-called “other race” 
used in this experiment. Exposure to and experience individuating Caucasian and 
Asian faces may no longer be all that unusual for individuals living and attending 
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university in Hong Kong and the United States, respectively. Consequently, any 
differences in holistic processing between same-race and other-race faces may 
have been minimal at best. Perhaps if a truly novel or unusual race had been used 
for the other-race faces, a greater reduction in holistic processing would have been 
apparent. Indeed, while a roughly linear relationship between expertise and holistic 
processing has been suggested (Gauthier & Tarr, 2002; Richler, Cheung, & 
Gauthier 2011a) it is possible that over a much wider range of expertise, the 
relationship is not linear and that given enough expertise with faces, a certain 
propensity to process faces holistically is reached and such mechanisms generalize 
more easily to less familiar members of the face class.  
Another important reason why more obvious differences in holistic processing for 
same-race and other-race faces were not observed could be due to the specific 
races that were used in these experiments. Irrespective of individuals’ experience 
with these races, the importance of possible similarities in the underlying structure 
and general physiognomy of faces across different races should not be overlooked. 
Faces from different races often vary in terms of which features are the most 
diagnostic for discrimination and individuation (Ellis et al., 1975; O’Toole et al., 
1994), but it is possible that in this instance, the dimensions that were most useful 
for individuating the Caucasian faces largely overlapped with those best used for 
discriminating the Asian faces. As a result, the processing strategies employed for 
one race may have been more easily and effectively generalized to faces of the 
other race. It is possible that if two different races had been contrasted (such as 
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Asian and African American), a more pronounced difference in holistic processing 
would have been observed. Nonetheless, it should be again noted that with these 
two races I was still able to find evidence of a face race x subject race interaction 
(Experiment 2). 
It is also possible that we may process other-race and same-race faces equally 
holistically, and the critical difference between them is actually the degree to 
which they engage configural processing. With respect to holistic processing, it 
may be that the structural similarity between faces of different races is sufficiently 
similar that they can all be represented using a similar template, such that the 
individual features are not explicitly represented (e.g., Farah, Wilson, Drain, & 
Tanaka, 1998; Tanaka & Farah, 1993; Tsao & Livingstone, 2008), or cannot be 
judged independently of one another (Richler, Gauthier, Wenger, & Palmeri, 2008; 
Richler, Tanaka, Brown, & Gauthier, 2008; Richler, Wong, & Gauthier, 2011). 
However, experience with faces of a particular race may make us more sensitive to 
changes in the spatial relations (i.e., configural information) between features in 
same-race faces, which would not only result in the observed recognition 
advantage for same-race faces in the ORE, but could also explain why I frequently 
observed an overall discrimination advantage for same-race faces. Such an 
explanation would be consistent with findings of same-race advantages from the 
parts-whole, blurred-scrambled, and inversion paradigms (Hancock & Rhodes, 
2008; Hayward et al., 2008; Rhodes et al., 2009, 1989, 2006; Tanaka et al., 2004), 
all of which may better tap into configural rather than holistic proessing. 
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Additionally, this would be consistent with what we know about the inversion 
effect: inverted and upright faces are both processed holistically, but differ in terms 
of configural processing (Murray, 2004; Richler, Mack, et al., 2011).  
Finally, it should also be noted that even though I was not able to definitively 
identify any differences in the onset or timing of holistic processing in these 
experiments, that does not mean that a subtle but important one does not exist. The 
shortest stimulus duration in Experiment 2 was 50 ms, whereas Experiment 3 used 
33 ms; it is possible that important differences between other-race and same-race 
(or ingroup and outgroup) faces may appear earlier than this. Additionally, because 
I only sampled three stimulus durations, I did not have the temporal resolution to 
assess whether the rate at which holistic processing evolved was truly unaffected 
by race. Given the results of all four experiments, if race or social categorization do 
have a pronounced effect on holistic processing, then they are likely do so in terms 
of how early holistic processing is observed for same-race faces relative to other-
race faces. In Experiments 2 and 3, discrimination performance was already well 
above chance even at the shortest stimulus durations, so it was not possible to 
determine whether information begins to accumulate sooner for same-race or 
ingroup faces. To determine whether this is in fact the case, conducting a delayed 
recognition task similar to Curby & Gauthier (2009) with briefer stimulus durations 
would be necessary. A finer sampling of stimulus durations at the shorter end of the 
spectrum would allow for curve fitting so that potential differences in the rate at 
which information is encoded could also be compared. 
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 In this study, I investigated the ORE using the composite task, in an attempt to 
determine whether poorer recognition memory for other-race faces could be 
attributed to differences in holistic processing or overall sensitivity for same-race 
and other-race faces. Although I did not find strong evidence that the magnitude of 
holistic processing differs for the other-race and same-race faces used in these 
studies, my analyses were focused on group means, which may have failed to 
capture some important variability. Indeed, a study that was published after data 
collection for the studies in this dissertation had been completed corroborates this 
notion. Bukach and colleagues (2012) used the complete design of the composite 
task to assess the link between prior experience individuating other-race faces and 
the amount of holistic processing they elicited. Consistent with my findings, no 
differences in the magnitude of holistic processing were observed for other-race 
and same-race faces when examining the participant group means. However, 
examinations at the level of individual differences revealed a significant negative 
correlation between prior other-race individuation experience and the extent to 
which holistic processing was reduced for other-race faces relative to same-race 
faces. Given these results, it could be worth explicitly exploring the link between 
holistic processing and the ORE as it is traditionally measured in terms of individual 
differences. Perhaps with a large enough sample, one might find that participants 
with the poorest memory for other-race faces show a tendency to process them less 
holistically. It might also be interesting to include a task like the Affective Lexical 
Priming Score (ALPS, Lebrecht et al., 2009), which measures implicit social biases 
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for different races. This would allow for a direct examination of the extent to which 
differences in holistic processing for other-race and same-race faces can be 
accounted for by cognitive bias and racial attitudes.  
 
Conclusion 
In summary, the studies in this dissertation provide little evidence that other-race 
and same-race faces differ in terms of holistic processing. These results stand in 
stark contrast to previous work using the partial design that finds differences in 
holistic processing based on race or group status (Hugenberg & Corneille, 2009; 
Michel et al., 2007; Michel, Rossion, et al., 2006; Ratcliff et al., 2011). This 
demonstrates how important it is for conclusions that are based solely on the partial 
design method to be reevaluated using the complete design. Consistent with 
previous findings that holistic processing is robust to top-down manipulations, 
sociocogntive biases did not appear to influence holistic processing, although they 
can result in consistent discrimination advantages for same-race and ingroup faces, 
which arise early and may, in turn, translate into enhanced recognition memory as 
is seen in the ORE. In the studies I ran, the ORE was rarely reflected in holistic 
processing, thus it appears that at least for the conditions tested in this dissertation, 
the structural similarity between the same-race and other-race faces was high 
enough to support generalization of holistic processing mechanisms across the two 
types faces. However, one experiment did indicate that in some instances, 
  
   91 
differences in holistic processing for same-race and other-race faces can arise, 
which would likely impact recognition memory performance. This difference 
cannot be accounted for by top-down biases, so if reduced holistic processing is 
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